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ARTICLE 
COPYRIGHT AS MARKET PROSPECT 
SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH† 
For many decades now, copyright jurisprudence and scholarship have looked to 
the common law of torts—principally trespass and negligence—in order to 
understand copyright’s structure of entitlement and liability. This focus on 
property—and harm-based torts—has altogether ignored an area of tort law with 
significant import for our understanding of copyright law: tortious interference with 
a prospective economic advantage. This Article develops an understanding of 
copyright law using tortious interference with a prospect as a homology. Tortious 
interference with a prospect allows a plaintiff to recover when a defendant’s 
volitional actions interfere with a potential economic benefit that was likely to accrue 
to the plaintiff prior to the defendant’s intervention. Premised on the idea of a 
probabilistic harm and driven by instrumental considerations, the tort works by 
treating a possible market benefit as the basis of an interest that is worthy of 
protection against specific behavior. As a supposed incentive for creativity, copyright 
law operates in ways that are strikingly similar to tortious interference with a 
prospect. Much like tortious interference with a prospect, it functions by first 
identifying a zone of probabilistic market benefits, and then protecting that zone 
against specific volitional interferences through a framework of liability. This Article 
unpacks the strong analytical and normative parallels between the two, and argues 
that their similarity sheds new and important light on several persistent puzzles 
within current copyright jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since its origins in the eighteenth-century, Anglo-American 
copyright law has attempted to understand its entitlement structure through 
the idea of property. Originally described as a form of “literary property,”1 
 
1 See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 1-8 (1993) 
(discussing the history of the concept of copyright as “literary property,” and describing how the 1710 Statute 
of Anne established the author as a “legally empowered figure in the marketplace”); see also JODY GREENE, 
THE TROUBLE WITH OWNERSHIP: LITERARY PROPERTY AND AUTHORIAL LIABILITY IN ENGLAND, 
1660–1730 4 (2005) (“Insofar as the Act of Anne constituted a method for keeping track of those responsible 
for literary works, it also put into effect a system for recording liability for them.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale 
of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991-92 (1990) 
(“[O]ne of the ‘fundamental ideas’ of the revolutionary copyright laws is the principle that ‘an exclusive right 
is conferred on authors because their property is the most justified because it flows from their intellectual 
creation.’” (quoting CLAUDE COLUMBET, PROPRIÈTÈ LITTÈRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 8 (4th ed. 1988))); 
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courts and scholars today continue to analyze copyright’s grant of exclusivity 
through various doctrines from the common law of property.2 Ideas and 
concepts deriving from trespass to land and chattels,3 the law of licenses,4 first 
possession,5 choses in action,6 adverse possession,7 and more recently the law 
of theft,8 feature rather routinely in copyright jurisprudence and scholarship. 
Indeed, so pervasive is the influence of property thinking that the copyright 
statute’s refusal to cover certain categories of works at one time even raised 
concerns to some about “private property” being “taken” under the Fifth 
Amendment.9 More recently, scholars have shifted their emphasis from the 
 
Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (2003) (“Embedded in this metaphor is an implicit narrative about the origin 
of copyright, a version of the familiar Enlightenment narrative about the origin of landed property in 
general.”). 
2 For general criticisms of this trend, see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking 
Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126 (2009); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-
Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 141 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic 
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1996). 
3 See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217 (1985) (“It follows that interference with 
copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 5 (2003) (“An 
author’s right to ward off unauthorized copying of his work is much like a homeowner’s right to keep 
trespassers off his land.”); Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass–Copyright Parallels and the Harm–Benefit 
Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2009) (“[T]he cause of action known as ‘copyright 
infringement’ possesses much the same structure as does trespass to land . . . .”). 
4 See generally Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling 
Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2013) (explaining 
that federal courts “have not hesitated to develop and apply principles of license construction 
derived from federal copyright policy”). 
5 See Richard Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2005) (“To be sure, Locke did not offer any explicit treatment one way or 
the other of intellectual property rights, which adds to his charm. But it hardly follows that his 
theory has no implications for the area.”). 
6 See Spencer Brodhurst, Is Copyright a Chose in Action?, 11 LAW Q. REV. 64 (1895) (“[I]t is very 
doubtful whether rights, or in fact anything incorporeal, can properly be included [as a chose in action] 
. . . .”); T.T. Cyprian Williams, Property, Things in Action, and Copyright, 11 LAW Q. REV. 223, 223 (1895) 
(“[C]opyrights and similar rights are more analogous to choses in action than choses in possession . . . .”). 
7 For a judicial opinion finding copyright title based on adverse possession, see O’Neill v. Gen. 
Film Co., 152 N.Y.S. 599, 603 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff ’d as modified, 171 A.D. 854 (App. Div. 1916). But see 
Matthew Daus, Adverse Possession of Copyright, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 45, 57 (1992) (“The traditional 
elements of adverse possession cannot successfully be applied to the acquisition of a copyright 
because it is intangible property.”). 
8 See, e.g., Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property Infringement as Vandalism, 
18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331, 337-38 (2015) (“The IP owner, just like the property owner, generally 
mixes her labor with pre-existing materials to provide society with goods and help it flourish . . . . 
The more rivalrous intellectual property turns out to be in a given case, the more it resembles 
property and the more its infringement parallels theft.”). 
9 See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 162 (3d 
ed. 2010) (“Some commentators [to the 1976 Copyright Act] expressed concern about . . . the 
potential ‘takings’ arguments that might be raised.”). 
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law of property to tort law to understand copyright.10 The move in this 
direction was initially prompted by a focus on property torts—i.e., tort 
doctrines that protect private property such as trespass—since courts 
sporadically described copyright infringement actions in these terms.11 In due 
course, the comparisons expanded to tort doctrines that were less about 
property protection and more about balancing the plaintiff and defendant, 
such as the doctrines of negligence and nuisance.12 This latter move was 
underwritten by the increasingly instrumentalist and utilitarian orientation 
that American copyright thinking has taken on in the last few decades, which 
emphasizes the need to balance copyright protection against ease of access.13 
The common law has thus proven to be a fertile source of conceptual guidance 
for copyright jurisprudence. 
All the same, copyright thinking has unduly limited itself in focusing 
principally on property-based or balance-driven aspects of the common law 
of torts. The focus on trespass, negligence, and nuisance—all mainstream and 
well-understood doctrines—has certainly meant that copyright law has never 
had to independently establish the legitimacy of the common law doctrines 
to which it is looking; it has also limited such reliance almost entirely to the 
structural realm. In other words, the common law has thus far proven to be 
helpful in shedding light on how copyright law might develop mechanisms to 
realize its underlying objectives that are predetermined. Yet the connection 
has almost never been used to say anything of significance about the very 
rationality, normative desirability, and construction of those objectives. This 
is for an obvious reason: each of the common law areas hitherto used to 
analyze copyright jurisprudence seeks to realize objectives that are ill-
suited—without significant adaptation—to those of copyright law. 
 
10 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1569, 1573 (2009) (“[T]he common law has come to recognize that there are limits to human 
predictive capacities . . . . Its principal device to that end is the concept of foreseeability.”); Oren 
Bracha & Patrick Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2016) (“[C]opyright 
accidents should be governed by a negligence rule.”); Patrick R. Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of 
Copyright Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1888 (2016) (“[C]opyright infringement is composed of 
five different torts, and this explains why infringement analysis is so changeable.”); Wendy J. 
Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 535 (2003). 
11 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) 
(describing an infringer as “anyone who trespasses into [the copyright owner’s] exclusive domain by 
using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work”); Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 
62, 66 (1st Cir. 2009) (using the term “trespasses” to describe the action of infringing a copyright). 
12 See generally Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 301 (2015); Steven Hetcher, The Fault Liability Standard in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 431 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed. 2013). 
13 For a good summary of this utilitarian orientation and its effects, see ABRAHAM 
DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 17-53 (2015). 
2018] Copyright as Market Prospect 447 
Consider efforts to understand aspects of copyright law through 
negligence doctrine. Negligence law is seen to be about deterring harmful 
behavior,14 spreading the costs of harms once they occur,15 or realizing 
corrective justice between the wrongdoer and the victim through a regime of 
liability.16 Extended to copyright, each of these ideals proves to be grossly 
incomplete. Unlike the tangible harm with which negligence commonly 
concerns itself, the harm that copyright seeks to prevent is a contested and 
multifaceted issue.17 Similarly, cost-spreading in copyright requires an account 
of when and how something is a cost to begin with (rather than a benefit or an 
accepted reality of human interaction) since the harm at issue in copyright is 
either notional or predictive. Further, the ideal of corrective justice is itself 
dependent on an underlying normative equilibrium that must be justified by 
an altogether independent set of principles about rights and wrongs.18 
Consequently, to the extent that concepts from negligence law are of utility to 
copyright, their contribution lies primarily in their ability to structure 
copyright doctrine and thinking. This is seen to allow copyright to further its 
values that are in turn derived from other (i.e., non-common law) sources. 
Copyright’s use of the common law has been principally in the form of a 
structural analogy so far. Yet closely connected to, but nonetheless distinct 
from an analogy, is the concept of a homology. An analogy focuses on a 
resemblance between two or more concepts or ideas, but makes no claim as 
to the relationship between the objects of the comparison.19 The similarity 
 
14 See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 657-58 (1975) (“In 
terms of the goal of ‘optimal deterrence’ . . . [t]he injurer should avoid the accident whenever . . . 
the accident prevention by him is socially more desirable.”); see also Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1980). 
15 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
39 (1970) (“The justification found most often among legal writers today for allocation of accident 
losses on a nonfault basis is that accident losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly 
among people and over time.”). 
16 See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 58 (2003) (arguing that the principle 
of corrective justice “best explains tort law”); see also ERNEST WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012). 
17 For an elaboration, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 10, at 452, 466 (“Harm is usually considered a 
shortfall from some baseline . . . there are potentially an infinite number of possible baselines.”). 
18 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative Structure of Copyright Law, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 10, at 313, 315 (“As an institution 
that is just over three hundred years old, copyright has its own unique normative structure.”); Patrick 
R. Goold, Corrective Justice and Copyright Infringement, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 251, 266-67 (2014) 
(“Corrective justice theory views tort law as a system for correcting . . . wrongful losses and wrongful 
gains.”); Gordon, supra note 10, at 535 (“As tort law . . . make[s] an actor reduce or stop his harm-
causing activity, copyright law . . . make[s] an actor increase or continue his beneficial activity.”). 
19 For the seminal work on analogy, see DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER & EMMANUEL SANDERS, 
SURFACES AND ESSENCES: ANALOGY AS THE FUEL AND FIRE OF THINKING (2013). For work on 
analogical reasoning in the law, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 
1-28 (rev. ed. 2013); see also Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. 
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may be attributable—in its entirety—to coincidence. Consequently, the 
process of analogizing one concept or doctrine to another requires no account 
of why the comparison is independently justified, beyond the obvious 
existence of the similarities at issue. Drawn from evolutionary thinking, a 
homology on the other hand focuses on a resemblance between two or more 
ideas but in addition makes an implicit claim about the common origins of 
those ideas.20 It claims that the similarity under scrutiny is apparent because 
of a commonality in source. That common source may be a shared 
institutional origin or a shared set of motivating goals and ideals. As such, 
the explanatory burden of a homology is significantly higher than that of a 
mere analogy. 
In this Article, I argue that the common law can be more than a structural 
analogy for copyright thinking; it can also provide a useful homology for 
copyright law. The basis for such a common law homology is to be found, 
not in the well-worn doctrines of property and tort law, but instead in an 
under-analyzed common law doctrine: tortious interference with a prospective 
economic advantage. This doctrine is a close sibling of a claim known as tortious 
interference with contract or “inducement to breach,” which allows recovery 
when a third party defendant intentionally interferes with a contract between 
two others and procures a breach.21 While inducement to breach is premised on 
the existence of a valid contractual relationship between two parties,22 tortious 
interference with a prospective economic advantage—or “tortious interference 
with a prospect” for short—allows a claim when the economic benefit that was 
interfered with by the defendant was itself entirely probabilistic. 23 
While initially developed to render the defendant’s liability independent 
of the formal validity of an underlying contract, tortious interference with a 
 
REV. 1179, 1186 (1999) (“[T]he virtue of analogical reasoning lies in a variety of indirect benefits that 
are likely to result when judges adopt it as a practice and consider themselves obliged to explain new 
decisions in terms of their relation to past cases.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (2013) (“[F]our different but overlapping features . . . produce both the virtues 
and the vices of analogical reasoning in the law.”). 
20 See, e.g., STANLEY SHOSTAK, EVOLUTION OF SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE 83 (1999) 
(“[H]omologies connote similar molecules allegedly descendant from hypothetical ancestors . . . .”); 
see also, e.g., MARY JANE WEST-EBERHARD, DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY AND EVOLUTION 
485-97 (2003) (“Homology-similarity due to common descent is the cornerstone of comparative 
evolutionary research.”). 
21 For early work on the scope and history of the doctrine, see generally Charles E. Carpenter, 
Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928); Fowler V. Harper, Interference with 
Contractual Relations, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 873 (1952). 
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The 
particular agreement must be in force and effect at the time of the breach that the actor has caused; 
and if for any reason it is entirely void, there is no liability for causing its breach.”). 
23 See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN AND ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 638 (2d ed. 2011). 
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prospect has since expanded to cover a variety of other prospective 
situations.24 In each of these situations, the law attempts to balance a 
defendant’s behavior that caused the economic loss against a putative zone of 
probable benefits that the plaintiff is seen as entitled to.25 Such balancing, in 
turn, engages a variety of important considerations such as the bad faith of 
the defendant, concerns about freeriding, the incentive effects of protection 
(and non-protection), its effect on the general public interest and social 
welfare, and concerns about the types and norms of competition in the market 
at issue.26 In order to realize these goals contextually, tortious interference 
with a prospect has come to develop a nuanced doctrinal structure that is 
uniquely adapted to the probabilistic nature of the benefit and the balancing 
exercise involved. Owing to the entirely probabilistic nature of the prospect 
that is being protected, the tort identifies the boundaries of that prospect ex 
post, in an effort to produce an extremely nascent form of a property-like 
interest (in the prospect).27 It then protects this interest with due caution 
against overreach by focusing primarily on the defendant’s behavior and its 
actual and potential effects on the prospect through the highly tailored 
individual elements of the action.28 
Reduced to its core, copyright law operates in an almost identical fashion, 
and for similar reasons. Like tortious interference with a prospect, it protects 
a zone of probabilistic benefits—the market for a work of expression—by 
assigning it to the author/plaintiff. Instead of just treating the work as the 
object of a property interest, copyright law focuses on protecting the prospect 
through an elaborate focus on the nature of the defendant’s actions that 
interfere with the realization of the prospect. Copyright law has thus never 
treated all uses of the protected work as actionable.29 This focus on the 
prospective benefit (rather than the work as property) is captured in the 
highly specified forms of behavior (i.e., reproduction, distribution, 
performance, etc.) that define the extent of each of copyright law’s rights, the 
elaborate apparatus that constitutes its infringement analysis, and the 
 
24 Id. § 641 (“The Restatement, with explicit agreement of some courts, protects any kind of 
reasonable economic expectancy against intentional and improper interference, so long as the 
plaintiff can prove a reasonable probability that the opportunity would have been realized but for 
the defendant’s intentional and improper interference . . . .”). 
25 Id. § 640. 
26 Id. 
27 For discussions of this property interest, see generally Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An 
Analysis of the Formation of Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other 
Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1116 (1983); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual 
Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1510 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Tortious Interference]. 
28 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
29 Indeed, this is a bedrock principle of copyright law that was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S 99, 102 (1879). 
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considerations that motivate its balancing exercise under the rubric of fair 
use. In short, each of the common law’s analytical components that are seen 
in tortious interference with a prospect finds strong correspondence in 
accepted copyright doctrine. 
Perhaps most importantly though, the similarity is more than just of pure 
analytical value. It contains lessons for several of copyright’s enduring 
doctrinal puzzles, which it recasts as embodiments of tortious interference 
with a prospect, and offers lessons for their resolution. First, it suggests that 
the true object of protection for modern copyright law—at least in the U.S.—
is neither the “work” nor the “author,” as has been commonly assumed. It is 
instead the prospective market for the work, a probabilistic entitlement that 
the system should be more willing to contextually tailor and define. Second, 
it reveals that copyright law’s bifurcation of “copying” into factual and 
normative components can be streamlined once the overall basis of liability 
is rationalized through the idea of copying. Third, it shows that “copying,” 
central to copyright’s liability calculus, does indeed embody an element of 
advertence/volition, which does not detract from the structure of copyright 
infringement as a strict liability tort. And fourth, it identifies how copyright 
law can avoid the needless redundancy between fair use and elements of the 
infringement analysis. 
The homological account of copyright and tortious interference with a 
prospect developed in this Article is both descriptive and normative. On the 
one hand, the strong symmetry between the conceptual structure of copyright 
and tortious interference with a prospect suggests underappreciated insights 
into the working of copyright doctrine. At the same time, it also highlights 
how those very mechanisms might themselves be reshaped to give effect to 
ideals and values that are common to both. The theory offered herein is 
therefore interpretive.30 
Besides suggesting modifications to copyright doctrine, the homology 
between copyright and tortious interference with a prospect also brings out 
important lessons for copyright theorizing and lawmaking. It helps makes 
sense of copyright’s dominant theory of creator incentives, according to which 
copyright’s primary purpose is to “supply” creators with an incentive to 
create.31 The homology reveals this to be only partially true, and that 
copyright’s real function lies in protecting rather than supplying creators’ market 
incentives. The homology also pushes in the direction of thinking about 
copyright as a framework of liability, rather than entitlement, which is more 
than just of semantic significance. Lastly, it strongly recommends a more 
 
30 For a general account of interpretive theory, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 464 (1986). 
31 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (noting that 
“copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas” (emphasis added)). 
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active role for courts in shaping the copyright entitlement, thereby 
contributing to copyright law and policy by engaging the discourse of 
copyright’s normative goals more directly. 
Part I of the Article begins with an analytical overview of tortious 
interference with a prospective economic advantage. It traces the general 
development of the action as a subsidiary to the inducement of breach action 
(I.A.); describes the manner in which it has evolved as a distinctive action 
(I.B.); and then sets out some of the normative criteria that motivate courts’ 
application and development of the tort (I.C.). Part II highlights the 
homology between copyright and tortious interference and unpacks the 
content of copyright’s entitlement and liability structures through the action 
of tortious interference with a prospect. It develops the idea of a homological 
theory as an interpretive exercise and sets out its core tenets (II.A); argues 
that copyright and tortious interference deserve to be understood as a 
homology owing to a common plurality of normative motivations underlying 
both regimes (II.B); and shows how copyright’s fundamental doctrinal 
puzzles may be fruitfully understood through the working of tortious 
interference doctrine (II.C). Part III examines the broader implications that 
flow from the homology and focuses on three: justificatory (III.A); analytical 
(III.B); and institutional (III.C). 
I. THE FORGOTTEN TORT ACTION: INTERFERENCE 
WITH A PROSPECT 
Despite having a long pedigree of their own, intentional torts—wrongs 
committed through a defendant’s intentional actions—have come to receive 
significantly less scholarly attention than have their fault-based 
counterparts (i.e., negligence).32 Even within the category of intentional 
torts, those focusing on harms to person and property, such as assault and 
trespass, tend to dominate the discussion. Given this landscape, tortious 
interference with a prospective economic advantage is all but ignored in any 
serious discussion about tort law and comparisons thereto. In addition to 
this benign neglect, tortious interference with a prospect also suffers from 
the problem of being overshadowed by its sister action of intentional 
interference with a contract (also known as inducement to breach a 
 
32 See, e.g., David Howarth, Is There a Future for Intentional Torts?, in THE CLASSIFICATION 
OF OBLIGATIONS 233, 266 (Peter Birks ed. 1997); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (1981) (“‘Intent’ is not a 
normal part of the economist’s vocabulary . . . . [P]erhaps this is why there is so little writing on 
intentional torts as such.”); Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2006) (noting how there is “much more complexity to the structure of 
intentional tort doctrine than we typically assume”). 
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contract), which has received significantly more attention over the years. 
While similar in their broad structure, the two actions are distinct in many 
important analytical and normative respects.33 This Part provides an 
overview of tortious interference with a prospect. Section I.A describes the 
origins and development of tortious interference with a contract, the 
original tortious interference claim; Section I.B. then focuses on the 
distinctiveness of interference with a prospect from a doctrinal perspective; 
and Section I.C examines the theoretical considerations motivating the 
construction and application of tortious interference with a prospect. 
A. Tortious Interference in General 
Of the various torts that fall under the generic category of “tortious 
interference,” tortious interference with a contract, otherwise known as 
intentional inducement of breach, remains the best known and most 
commonly invoked. Its prominence within the broader category is also 
reflective of the manner in which the category evolved as a whole. Some 
scholars trace the roots of the claim back to Roman law, which allowed a 
master to recover from a third party for behavior that interfered with the 
ability of a servant to perform his duties to the master.34 Early English law 
adopted the Roman law claim into the common law, and in addition came to 
introduce an independent statutory claim for “procurement” or 
“enticement.”35 These were distinct situations where a third party had 
succeeded in luring a servant away from his or her master.36 This position 
continued until the mid-nineteenth century, when the tortious interference 
action received its clearest common law formulation in the now-celebrated 
case of Lumley v. Gye.37 
The case arose out of a situation where a prominent opera singer, Johanna 
Wagner, had contracted to sing exclusively at the plaintiff ’s theatre for three 
months.38 The defendant, who operated a competing theatre, persuaded 
Wagner to break her contract with the plaintiff and to perform at his theatre 
 
33 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, §638. 
34 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 663-66 (1923) 
(describing the tradition of the paterfamilias bringing on action when a servant is injured and loss of 
services is suffered). 
35 Id. at 664-65; see also Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1514-15 (1980) (“The law 
strengthened a master’s control over his servants by preventing others from interfering with the 
relationship during the term of service.”). 
36 See Sayre, supra note 34, at 665-66 (“This enactment did not wipe away the preexisting 
common law action for injuring another’s servants through violence; it created an additional 
statutory remedy for enticing another’s servants with features quite distinct from those of the 
common law action.”). 
37 Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.). 
38 Id. at 752. 
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instead.39 While the plaintiff commenced an action against Wagner for breach 
of contract, he independently brought an action against the defendant for 
inducing the breach of his contract with Wagner.40 In addressing this claim, 
the court chose to expand the action for enticement into a more general 
principle and ultimately found for the plaintiff, noting that it was “clear law 
that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, 
with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant by 
procuring the servant to depart from the master’s service . . . commits a 
wrongful act for which he is responsible at law.”41 The formal structure of a 
master–servant relationship was hardly essential to the court’s formulation, 
and it went on to conclude that there was “no reason for confining the case to 
services or engagements under contracts for services of any particular 
description” and that it “may well apply to all cases where there is an unlawful 
and malicious enticing away of any person employed to give his personal 
labour or service for a given time under the direction of a master or employer 
who is injured by the wrongful act.”42 
In the end, the court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had 
acted “maliciously” under the facts of the case.43 Yet, in principle some of the 
judges in the case appeared perfectly willing to equate malice with actual 
notice of the underlying contract. Thus emerged the action of tortious 
interference with a contract as a formal and independent claim at common 
law. A few decades later, the case of Bowen v. Hall affirmed the principle 
developed in Lumley, converting it into a recognized doctrine of the common 
law.44 Adding content to the elements, the court in Bowen further noted that 
not all attempts to persuade a party to breach its contract were actionable as 
such. “[I]f the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff,” only 
then is it “a malicious act which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore 
a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it.”45 
Shortly thereafter, the case of Temperton v. Russell expanded the reach of the 
action to encompass any type or category of contract, while affirming the 
prior courts’ conception of malice.46 
 
39 Id. 
40 This action became a celebrated contract law case in its own right. Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 
64 Eng. Rep. 1209 (Ch. Div.). 
41 Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. at 752-53. 
42 Id. at 753. 
43 Id. at 755. 
44 Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 QBD 333, 339 (Eng.). 
45 Id. at 337. 
46 Temperton v. Russell (No. 2), (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 727-28 (Eng.) (finding the limitation of the 
principle to personal service contracts to be untenable). 
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It wasn’t long before the case and its progeny received significant attention 
among American courts and scholars.47 The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the 
doctrine in 1894, with a majority of states doing the same shortly before.48 As 
this occurred, however, courts applying the doctrine came to imbue it with an 
important modification. The element of “malicious” behavior came to be 
stripped of its independent analytical significance. As long as a defendant was 
shown to have known of the preexisting contract and to have acted in an 
intentional manner thereafter to procure its breach, the action was deemed 
satisfied.49 Additionally, the defendant’s market-driven motivations underlying 
the inducement were also treated as largely irrelevant.50 
These developments caused one early commentator to lament that 
American courts had converted the doctrine “into a sweeping generalization, 
applicable to every case where a third party through his conduct causes the 
breach of a known contract.”51 Yet, in some ways this was hardly a mere 
 
47 For early scholarly attention, see James Barr Ames, Purchaser for Value Without Notice, 1 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1887) (citing Lumley to explain the tort of destroying the property for an 
obligee); Ernst Freund, Malicious and Unlawful Interference, 11 HARV. L. REV. 449, 451 (1898) 
(explaining how Lumley applies the theory of the right to employ labor “free from undue 
interference”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1894) 
(explaining that Lumley and its progeny “simply establish the principle that a contractual obligation 
operates not merely upon the person bound to performance, but upon every one else, insofar as he 
must not procure a breach of that obligation . . . .”); Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Brief Survey 
of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 55, 57 (1887) (discussing the idea that “a right created by a 
personal obligation can be violated by an act which constitutes a tort”); William Schofield, The 
Principle of Lumley v. Gye, and Its Application, 2 HARV. L. REV. 19, 23 (1888). Lumley was cited for 
the first time in an argument before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1855. See Ela v. 
Smith, 71 Mass. 121, 129 (1855) (discussing the liability of defendants if they had aided others in 
unlawful acts). For the earliest American case law taking notice of the development, see Chambers 
& Marshall v. Baldwin, 1889 WL 1256, at *1 (Ky. Super. May 8, 1889), arguing the dictum of Lumley 
extended the case’s principles. See also Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 565 (1871) (expressing some 
doubt about the doctrine); Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 240 (1883) (discussing limitations in the 
doctrine’s application); Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 1880 WL 10954, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1880) (showing that enticement action is not strictly based on a master-servant relationship); Duffies 
v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 523 (Wis. 1890) (using Lumley as an example of the many relationships to 
which the doctrine applies). 
48 See Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha Ry. Co., 151 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1894) (“It 
has been repeatedly held that, if one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties, and 
induced one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the party injured can maintain 
an action against the wrongdoer . . . .”); see also Note, Lumley v. Gye in the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 425, 428 (1894) (noting that “Mr. Justice Brewer . . . adopts the principle of Lumley v. Gye”). 
49 See, e.g., Beekman v. Marsters, 80 N.E. 817, 819 (Mass. 1907) (“[If] the defendant [knew] of 
the contract between the plaintiff and the hotel corporation [and] intentionally and without 
justification induced the hotel corporation to break [the contract] . . . . [t]hat is proof of malice 
. . . .”). For a criticism of the case, see Sayre, supra note 34, at 676-77. 
50 See, e.g., Beekman, 80 N.E. at 818 (“No case has been cited which holds that a right to compete 
justifies a defendant in intentionally inducing a third person to take away from the plaintiff his 
contractual rights.”). 
51 Sayre, supra note 34, at 677. 
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product of American lawmaking. As previously discussed, the court in Lumley 
had itself equated malice with notice of the contract.52 Later courts signed on 
to the idea that a benefit (to the defendant) coupled with a detriment (to the 
plaintiff) also evidenced such malice, a structure that was common to just 
about any knowing breach.53 Rhetoric aside, malice therefore does not appear 
to have been a consciously designed constraint during the early framing of 
the doctrine. American courts and scholars interpreting the malice 
requirement came to understand it as connoting the absence of a justification 
or privilege for the defendant’s behavior and nothing more.54 The idea of 
malice as ill will or bad motive never quite took off. As long as a defendant 
knew that the act was likely to result in a breach, and did in fact produce such 
a breach, the element was deemed satisfied. 
As should be apparent, the gradual crystallization of the doctrine around 
an identifiable interest of the plaintiff (contractual performance), and a 
concurrent expansion of the defendant’s behavior that might trigger liability, 
in effect created a property-like interest in the claimant.55 In other words, 
the tort had the direct effect of converting an in personam contractual 
relationship (that existed between the parties to the contract) into a broader 
in rem obligation against anyone with knowledge of the contract. That 
obligation was of course—unlike regular property—limited to not inducing 
a breach of the contract. Yet, it crystallized the propertization of the 
contractual obligation. Indeed, this point was brought home most forcefully 
in one court’s explicit observation that the doctrine allowed a contract to 
 
52  Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 752-53 (Q.B.). 
53 See, e.g., Bowen v. Hall, (1881) 6 QBD 333, 338 (Eng.); see also Note, Tortious Interference, 
supra note 27, at 1527 (“Since virtually all interference works to the benefit of the third party and the 
detriment of the plaintiff, this definition of malice enabled courts to impose liability in almost any 
case of inducement.”). 
54 See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 735 (1928) (“Malice in the sense of bad motive is not a 
requisite of the prima facie tort.”); see also Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 87 A. 927, 931 
(Md. 1913), aff ’d, 237 U.S. 447 (1915) (“Malice in this form of action does not mean actual malice, or 
ill will, but consists in the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse.”). 
But see Sayre, supra note 34, at 675 (“‘Malice’ connotes a mental element.”). 
55 See Carpenter, supra note 21, at 732 (“The promisee’s interest . . . is to have performance of 
the contract. He has also an interest as respects third persons in having the contract right which he 
has against the promisor free from invasions by third persons which may either prevent, retard, or 
lessen the value of its performance.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual 
Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 351 (1980) (“[T]he interference torts courts have recognized a 
kind of property right in contracts, because the contract, which begins as an agreement between two 
persons has somehow come to bind persons who were not parties to it and do not benefit from it.”); 
Fine, supra note 27, at 1118 (“[A] party expecting to enter into a contract has a property right . . . .”); 
Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1524 (noting that under the doctrine, “breach of a 
contractual promise is a violation of property rights”). Even some early courts characterized it as 
such. See, e.g., Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 A. 230, 232 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (“That the interest 
of an employer or an employ[ee] in a contract for services is property is conceded.”). 
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“impose[] on all the world the duty of respecting that contractual 
obligation.”56 Tortious interference with a contract thus created a framework 
of exclusion—from the underlying contractual obligation—through a regime 
of liability—an analytical structure that has been described elsewhere as a 
form of “quasi-property.”57 
In the tort’s development during the first quarter of the twentieth century, 
primary reliance on the formal elements of the claim proved to be inadequate, 
as courts and scholars became increasingly aware that doctrinal rules 
themselves were indeterminate and driven by normative criteria.58 What soon 
emerged in place of a mechanistic application of the elements was recognition 
that a claimant’s property (or property-like) interest needed to be balanced 
against the market-driven interests of defendants, and of society (in free 
competition) more generally.59 This, in turn, produced an emphasis on 
“balancing” competing considerations. One leading commentator thus 
proposed a general approach in the following terms: 
Whether a privilege of invasion exists depends on whether it is of greater 
moment to society to protect the defendant in the invading activities than it 
is to protect and guard the plaintiff ’s interest from such invasions. An 
evaluation and balancing of the social import of the conflicting interests of 
the respective parties and of the social interests per se are involved. The 
defendant may be privileged to invade an interest of the plaintiff although it 
is not for the protection or furtherance . . . of a social interest of greater 
public import than is the social interest involved in the protection of the 
plaintiff ’s individual interest.60 
Balancing entailed examining both social and individual interests on both 
sides of the claim. In due course, courts developed a fairly rich jurisprudence 
of privileges and defenses that justified defendants’ actions and exempted 
them from a claim of tortious interference.61 
 
56 Temperton v Russell (No.2), (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 730 (Eng.). 
57 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1889, 1889-93 (2012) (discussing the contours of quasi-property and its reliance on relational 
liability); Dobbs, supra note 55, at 373. 
58 See Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1537 (“Formal reasoning could not resolve the 
dilemma, nor could blind appeal to conclusory doctrines such as malice.”). For an overview of this general 
current in legal thinking, manifested in the idea of Legal Realism, see generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2009). 
59 See Note, Tortious Interference, supra note 27, at 1537-38 (describing the two strategies that 
emerged to resolve this problem: new rules that “qualified both parties’ rights and privileges” and 
new attempts to balance competing interests). 
60 Carpenter, supra note 21, at 745. 
61 For a useful summary of this jurisprudence, see id. at 745-62. 
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This general approach—of balancing competing considerations—
continued through the 1970s, and culminated in a specific provision in the 
Second Restatement of Torts, which set out the various considerations that 
courts had come to employ as part of this process.62 The commentary 
accompanying the provision highlights the ambiguity accompanying the 
exercise and notes the reality that the ultimate decision “depends upon a 
judgment and choice of values in each situation.”63 The Restatement 
suggested liability only when the interference was both intentional and 
improper, with the impropriety in turn depending on balancing competing 
considerations.64 The interference with contract tort is intriguing because it 
enables courts to examine and balance competing normative considerations 
directly, and on an individual case-by-case basis. Rather than require that the 
balancing take place behind an abstract conceptual device, the mid-twentieth 
century evolution of the doctrine enabled the idea of the parties’ interests to 
be laid out directly during the litigation. This in turn required courts to 
confront their own roles as adjudicators not just of formal claims/criteria, but 
of the relative and situational importance of the competing considerations at 
stake. This approach continues to this day. A leading treatise on American 
tort law describes the balancing approach that courts developed as the “good 
sense” approach.65 
As understood today, tortious interference with a contract embodies six 
key elements:66 
First, there must be a valid contract in existence. 
Second, the defendant must have known of the contract’s existence before 
its breach, since without which the intentionality question becomes moot. 
The defendant need not have known the specifics of the contract (i.e., its 
individual provisions). Therefore, circumstantial evidence of knowledge is 
usually sufficient.67 
Third, the interference must be intentional. Courts have interpreted this 
requirement to mean either the existence of a specific purpose—to interfere—
on the part of the defendant, or instead the defendant’s knowledge that the 
 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
63 Id. at § 767 cmt. b. 
64 See id. at § 766 (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a 
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person 
not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the 
other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.” (emphasis added)). 
65 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 618 (“Most courts still decide what is an improper means 
or improper purpose in the way English courts did in the 19th century—by simply applying what 
the judge thinks is ‘good sense.’”). 
66 Id. § 619. 
67 See id. § 621 (detailing how intent and knowledge are to be proven). 
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interference was a “substantial certainty.”68 In practice, the intentionality 
requirement is hardly an onerous one. 
Fourth, the defendant must have had an “improper motive” or used 
“improper means.”69 In recent years, courts appear to be moving to the latter 
of these alternatives, and abandoning the former, which relies on an earlier 
conception of malice.70 
Fifth, the defendant’s interference must have caused the breach; it should 
not have occurred for reasons unconnected to the interference.71 
And sixth, the breach must cause the plaintiff some harm or detriment.72 
Of the six elements seen in the modern formulation of the tort, the 
element of “improper means” is perhaps the hardest to satisfy in practice, 
given its slipperiness. Acts that are independently criminal or tortious form 
only one part of the category of improper means.73 Beyond crimes and 
actionable wrongs, breaches of accepted ethical and professional standards 
and other forms of behavior that independently (of the interference claim) 
invite an element of disapprobation seem to qualify as well.74 Despite the 
claim having expanded to now cover a variety of different contractual 
situations and a diverse set of defendant behaviors, it is crucial to emphasize 
that it has yet to simplistically treat the act of “interference” as independently 
wrongful.75 Only when the interference is shown to be wrongful as an 
independent matter—either owing to the interests/rights involved, the 
defendant’s motives, or the independent impropriety of the actions as such—
does liability attach. Thus, while liability under the tort has grown, it has done 
so with close consideration of the normative issues at stake, a lesson that is 
important for copyright law. 
B. The Distinctiveness of the Action for a “Prospect” 
As the previous discussion reveals, tortious interference with a contract 
effectively generates a property-like entitlement around the contractual 
benefit that is meant to accrue to the contracting parties as a legal matter. 
 
68 Id. 
69 Id. §§ 622-629. 
70 See id. § 623 (describing a third—and most recent—stage in the development of this prong 
among courts wherein liability is based on the defendant’s “use of tortious or otherwise improper 
means of interference”). 
71 Id. § 619. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. §§ 627-29. 
74 Id. § 627. 
75 See Dobbs, supra note 55, at 344 (observing that “[t]o find a wrong in interference we shall 
have to add some factor besides the act of interfering by persuasion or honest representation” and 
arguing that “[we] should therefore put aside any notion that interference is in its nature ‘wrong’”). 
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Given that the law guarantees either contractual performance or its monetary 
equivalent to the contracting parties, tortious interference with a contract 
treats the de jure guarantee of an economically valuable benefit as worthy of 
independent protection through a regime of liability. 
The basis of the entitlement in tortious interference with a contract 
therefore originates in the central premise of contract law, according to which 
a legally enforceable agreement guarantees the contracting party some 
measure of benefit.76 Conversely, when a contract does not exist between the 
parties, the law obviously can no longer guarantee the accrual of some benefit. 
Nonetheless, there are numerous situations where a similar economic benefit 
is seen as probabilistically very likely, and therefore worthy of similar 
protection against improper interferences, even if not certain. It is to protect 
such situations, i.e., where the economic benefit is less than certain but 
nevertheless highly likely to accrue to a party, that tortious interference with 
a prospect developed as a distinctive claim. 
The origins of tortious interference with a prospect can be traced back to 
the case of Temperton v. Russell,77 an English case decided shortly after Lumley, 
wherein the court confirmed the logic of tortious interference but appeared 
willing to extend it further. The court there observed: 
The next point is, whether the distinction taken for the defendants between 
the claim for inducing persons to break contracts already entered into with 
the plaintiff and that for inducing persons not to enter into contracts with 
the plaintiff can be sustained, and whether the latter claim is maintainable in 
law. I do not think that distinction can prevail. There was the same wrongful 
intent in both cases, wrongful because malicious. There was the same kind of 
injury to the plaintiff. It seems rather a fine distinction to say that, where a 
defendant maliciously induces a person not to carry out a contract already 
made with the plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, it is actionable, but where 
he injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person from entering into 
a contract with the plaintiff, which he would otherwise have entered into, it 
is not actionable.78 
In short, the court in Temperton saw (a) an interference with a valid 
contractual benefit, and (b) an interference with a benefit that was likely to 
culminate in a contractual arrangement, as largely equivalent. In one respect, the 
court’s logic is persuasive: the mere formalization of a benefit through a contract 
 
76 Indeed, the very definition of a contract says as much, in understanding a contract as an 
agreement enforceable at law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, 
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
77 [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 (Eng.). 
78 Id. at 728. 
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does little to transform its substantive basis. Preventing a contract from being 
formed and preventing a contractual performance from happening once the 
contract is indeed formed, both produce identical harm to the claimant. Yet from 
another perspective, the distinction is analytically significant. 
Whereas in the one (i.e. the contract), contract law’s guarantee of a benefit 
to the claimant underwrites the basis for the entitlement that tort law then 
protects through a property-like regime; in the latter, that guarantee must be 
derived independently from the facts surrounding the parties’ interactions. 
In other words, determining whether the plaintiff had an interest that was 
itself worthy of protection from an interference—however improper or 
intentional the interference might have been—emerges as an important first 
step in the inquiry. This is unlike in the contractual setting, where the claim 
effectively outsources this step to contract law. 
While the action for tortious interference with a prospect is today 
commonly thought of as a derivative of tortious interference with a contract, 
some trace its origins back to the fifteenth century, and the common law’s 
development of actions for threatening a business’s profits with “mayhem and 
vex.”79 In its origins, the tort action therefore developed as a claim for unfair 
competition, designed to police the line between permissible and 
impermissible market-behavior.80 The action was in turn built on the 
recognition that in a competitive setting, one party always loses regardless of 
the legality of the other’s behavior. Mere harm/loss was therefore insufficient 
to trigger liability; something more was always needed. With the decision in 
Lumley and its expansion in Temperton, courts appear to have infused the 
common law’s understanding of tortious interference with considerations 
drawn from the early cases on unfair competition.81 
Tortious interference with a prospect does not appear to have gained 
much acceptance in the United States until the middle of the twentieth 
century, when a few state courts began recognizing the action.82 It was not 
until the 1970s that courts across the country began grappling with the 
contours of the tort, with some jurisdictions (e.g., California) adopting a 
more liberal approach to the tort, while others (e.g., New York) continuing to 
limit its scope and reach for fear of expanding liability to cover otherwise 
 
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
80 Some see this line of reasoning to correspond to some of the early landmark unfair 
competition cases. See id. (“In all of these cases liability was imposed for interference with business 
expectancies . . . but in all of them the actor’s conduct was characterized by violence, fraud, or 
defamation, and was tortious in character.”). 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., Masoni v. Bd. of Trade of San Francisco, 260 P.2d 205, 207 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1953) (“Actionable interference of this kind is not limited to inducing breach of an existing contract 
or other wrongful conduct but comprises also unjustifiably inducing a third person not to enter into 
or continue a business relation with another.”). 
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legitimate behavior.83 During this development, the action also took on 
different names—”interference with a business relation,” “interference with 
an economic opportunity,” or “interference with a prospective advantage”—
within different jurisdictions even though they encompassed the same 
claim.84 As applied today, the action has four elements: (i) the defendant must 
have known of the plaintiff ’s economic prospect and intended to interfere 
with it; (ii) the prospect must have been reasonably likely to be realized and 
not merely speculative; (iii) the interference must have been by improper 
means or with an improper motive; and (iv) the interference must have 
caused some harm to the plaintiff.85 
The first and fourth elements of the action are largely similar to tortious 
interference with a contract. Knowledge of a prospect, coupled with the 
substantial certainty that it will be interfered with, is sufficient to satisfy the 
elements of knowledge and intention. Additionally, the harm at issue is 
clearly economic harm. The real divergence arises in the second and third 
elements (i.e., in defining the prospect), and in characterizing the defendant’s 
behavior as wrongful. As should be apparent, these questions are not wholly 
unconnected to the first and fourth elements and exert a good deal of 
influence over them. 
On the question of a qualifying “prospect” and defendant wrongdoing, 
case law appears to reveal an inverse correlation.86 The more certain a 
prospect is, the lesser is the proof of defendant wrongdoing that the law 
insists on. An actual contract is thus the most certain of all prospects, an 
executory contract or invalid agreement slightly less certain, and so on. As 
the certainty of the prospect diminishes, courts demand heightened proof of 
actual defendant wrongdoing for liability to attach. Or, as one treatise puts 
it, the defendant has far greater privilege to interfere with opportunities than 
it would with an “existing and enforceable contract.”87 
This inverse correlation is important to appreciate, because it gives the 
“right” underlying the working of the tort a distinctively relational 
 
83 See, e.g., Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 871 (Cal. 1975) (“First of all, the tort is 
considerably more inclusive than actions based on contract or interference with contract, and thus 
is not dependent on the existence of a valid contract.”); Gold v. L.A. Democratic League, 122 Cal. 
Rptr. 732, 739 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (“An action lies for intentional interference with advantages 
which are merely prospective; such an action is governed by the principles applicable to the tort of 
inducing a breach of contract intentionally and without justification.”); Guard-Life Corp. v. S. 
Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 449 (N.Y. 1980) (“[G]reater protection is accorded 
an interest in an existing contract . . . than to the less substantive, more speculative interests in a 
prospective relationship . . . .”). 
84 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 638. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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dimension.88 Determining whether an action is potentially proscribed is 
dependent on the very nature of the interest involved and vice versa, 
requiring an understanding of the probabilistic and contingent nature of both 
ideas. To the extent that the tort recognizes a right in an economic prospect 
or opportunity, the nature of that right (and its violation) is itself dependent 
on the defendant’s actions and consequences. 
1. Identifying a Protectable Opportunity 
The first, and perhaps most important, step in establishing a claim for 
tortious interference with a prospect lies in identifying a protectable 
opportunity that qualifies as a prospect which the plaintiff is entitled to. Not 
surprisingly, courts have spent much time and effort trying to delineate a 
protectable opportunity for the tort. 
As a preliminary, courts insist that the prospect must be something more 
than a “mere hope.”89 It must instead be a “reasonable” as opposed to merely 
“subjective” expectancy.90 This distinction is hard to capture in the abstract, 
but appears to eliminate situations where the underlying facts, which form 
the basis of the expectation, are legally or factually incompatible with the 
expectancy. Thus, an at-will employee’s hope of long-term employment when 
the existing employment contract clearly suggests otherwise, would remain a 
subjective—and unreasonable—expectancy.91 Similarly, courts also insist that 
the prospect be one that was likely to have accrued to the plaintiff “but for” 
the defendant’s intervention.92 This conception appears more stringent than 
the reasonable–subjective distinction insofar as it demands proof of an actual 
benefit likely to accrue. It would therefore exclude situations where a plaintiff 
was precluded from placing a bid, and yet the bid—even if placed—would 
have likely lost out to other offers.93 In all of these situations, courts place 
 
88 For an elaborate theoretical account of this relational idea, see generally Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313 (2012). 
89 Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 272 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1971); see also Ethan Allen, Inc. v. 
Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 815 (Fla. 1994) (“The mere hope that some of its past 
customers may choose to buy again cannot be basis for a tortious interference claim.”); Gieseke ex 
rel. Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. IDCA, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 210, 222 (Minn. 2014) (“This must 
be something more than a mere hope or innate optimism of the salesman.”); United Educ. Distribs., 
LLC v. Educ. Testing Serv., 564 S.E.2d 324, 329 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
90 Stehno v. Spring Spectrum, 186 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Mo. 2006). 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 140 (3d Cir. 
2005) (discussing plaintiff ’s argument that plaintiff “would have obtained the contract but for the 
defendant’s marketing campaign”); Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1015 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (failing to show that plaintiffs would have entered into the contracts but for defendants’ 
interference). 
93 Santana, 401 F.3d at 140-41 (“However, even if [plaintiff] had had the opportunity to bid, 
one of the other two suppliers . . . could still have obtained the contract.”). 
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great emphasis on the background and surrounding factual circumstances 
before presuming the existence of a prospect. 
Despite these somewhat stringent tests, in practice courts appear quite 
willing to find the existence of a prospect in a variety of situations. Indeed, 
one treatise notes the existence of a disconnect between courts’ abstract 
rhetoric about the identification of a prospect and their actual use of the 
factual record to then find a prospect in ways that contradict their abstract 
statements.94 While some courts therefore appear to insist (in the abstract) 
that the action is only available against specific or identifiable “relationships”, 
these restrictive interpretations might be interpreted as little more than 
“overstatements” of courts’ search for a causal connection between the 
interference and the lost opportunity. 95 
Of the various jurisdictions that continue to endorse the tort, California 
appears to have the most advanced jurisprudence. California courts have 
developed a process for identifying a protectable prospect that balances both 
analytical and pragmatic considerations. They insist on the plaintiff 
establishing a “reasonable probability” and a counterfactual causal 
relationship between the interference and the benefit to the plaintiff.96 All 
the same, to identify a reasonable probability, they look to how much “chance” 
is involved in the actual accrual of the benefit. In making this assessment, 
they rely on William Prosser’s admonition that the prospect usually reflects a 
“background of business experience on the basis of which it is possible to 
estimate with some fair amount of success both the value of what has been 
lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it if the 
defendant had not interfered.”97 
The case of Youst v. Longo,98 decided by the Supreme Court of California, 
is a good example of courts’ approach to identifying a protectable prospect. 
The plaintiff was a racehorse owner who brought an action for intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage against the defendant, 
the rider of a competing racehorse.99 The plaintiff alleged that as a result of 
the defendant’s actions during the race (of striking the plaintiff ’s horse), he 
 
94 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 641 (“[C]ourts sometimes state the constraining rule and 
then later in the same opinion re-state it to eliminate its bite, undermining any confidence that the 
original statement was purposeful and exclusive.”). 
95 Id. § 641 & nn. 7-9 (making this point and citing to cases from different jurisdictions). In 
an alternative reading, these restrictions in courts’ rhetoric may be seen as meaningful. 
96 James V. Telfer, Comment, Interference with Prospective Gain: Must there be a Contract?, 
22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 408 (1985). 
97 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1006 (W. Page Keeton 
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
98 729 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1987). 
99 Id. at 730-31. 
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was prevented from winning a larger cash prize than he actually did.100 The 
cash prize was thus the prospect that the plaintiff claimed an entitlement to; 
the defendant’s intentional actions were alleged to have improperly interfered 
with this prospect. Central to the court’s analysis was its recognition that the 
prize at issue was a mere contest, a “speculative expectanc[y].”101 The Court 
went on to observe: 
Determining the probable expectancy of winning a sporting contest but for 
the defendant’s interference seems impossible in most if not all cases, 
including the instant case. Sports generally involve the application of various 
unique or unpredictable skills and techniques, together with instances of luck 
or chance occurring at different times during the event, any one of which 
factors can drastically change the event’s outcome. In fact, certain intentional 
acts of interference by various potential “defendant” players may, through 
imposition of penalties or increased motivation, actually allow the “victim” 
player or team to prevail. Usually, it is impossible to predict the outcome of 
most sporting events without awaiting the actual conclusion.102 
A sporting contest was thus held to be of too low probability to merit 
protection. 
Equally important in the Court’s conclusion was its recognition that 
unlike in some other speculative situations, there was also no independent 
public policy reason to allow protection for probable expectancies in sporting 
contests. The Court thus left in place protection under the tort for other kinds 
of chance-based expectancies, such as a recovery against a defendant who lost 
(or destroyed) the evidence that a plaintiff needed in order to bring a personal 
injury claim for an accident.103 The interest in a “prospective civil action” was 
thought to overcome the lack of certainty underlying the entitlement (to 
actual damages in the litigation).104 Similarly, it also left undisturbed a prior 
case that allowed recovery from a defendant who had caused the plaintiff to 
lose an election by sending out false information about the latter.105 Even 
though the plaintiff lost the election by a large margin, the court in the case 
had held that the recovery was permitted since the uncertainty in the 
entitlement (to the office) was overcome by the importance of communicating 
accurate information to the public during an election.106 
 
100 Id. at 731. 
101 Id. at 735. 
102 Id. at 736. 
103 Id. at 735. The case was Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
104 Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. 
105 Youst, 729 P.2d at 734. The case was Gold v. L.A. Democratic League, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1975). 
106 Youst, 729 P.2d at 734. 
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All of this points to three general rules that seem to be at play in courts’ 
approach to identifying a protectable entitlement under the tort. First, and 
unequivocally, uncertain expectancies are treated as unprotectable. These are 
typically situations where the element of chance or luck is central to the very 
realization of the benefit, or where the benefit is heavily dependent on the 
actions of other participants, which are in turn unpredictable. A gamble, lottery, 
or sporting chance represents just this kind of uncertainty, where the realization 
of the prize is far too probabilistic. To speak of an actual expectancy here—as 
opposed to a mere hope of a windfall—is seen as illogical. Second, while chance 
recoveries are excluded, the benefit does not need to be absolutely certain. 
Courts allow for probabilistic recoveries to be included under the idea of a 
benefit, as long as the probabilities are either under the control of the claimant, 
or discernible as a regular occurrence based on business experience. Third, and 
most importantly, courts appear willing to tolerate lower probabilities in the 
entitlement when accompanied by an identifiable public policy supporting the 
entitlement. In these situations, the low-probability entitlement is seen as 
incentivizing socially beneficial behavior by the plaintiff, rendering it worthy 
of independent protection under the tort. The plaintiff ’s ability to commence 
a personal injury lawsuit represents one such situation. 
In summary then, the common law has over the years come to develop a 
fairly coherent set of principles with which to distinguish between 
speculative chances and probable expectancies. The distinction embodies 
both analytical and evaluative components, a duality that is of relevance 
when we move to copyright law. 
2. Interference as Wrongdoing 
Perhaps even more so than with tortious interference with a contract, 
claims of tortious interference with a prospect involve the complex balancing 
of a defendant’s legitimate interests against the harm sustained by a plaintiff. 
The primary area where this nuance manifests itself is in courts’ marked 
reluctance to treat all loss-producing interferences with a prospect as per se 
actionable.107 The law instead pays close attention to differentiating between 
the mere result of the defendant’s conduct on the one hand—i.e., the plaintiff ’s 
harm—and the means employed in such conduct on the other. 
 
107 Indeed, when viewed in the abstract some have noted that the rules seem to suggest that 
“the whole competitive order of American industry is prima facie illegal.” Della Penna v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 745 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Professor Carl Auerbach at the 
ALI Proceedings leading to the passage of the Restatement). 
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Some early courts emphasized the element of motive in their analysis of 
the defendant’s wrongdoing.108 An “improper motive” was thus taken to be 
sufficient to find liability.109 In due course, this came to be abandoned, as 
courts came to appreciate the difficulty inherent in policing the boundary 
between a bad motive (one directed exclusively at harming the plaintiff, with 
no corresponding benefit) and a mixed one (one where the harm to a plaintiff 
is itself the basis for the defendant’s benefit).110 Consequently, the modern 
trend in cases of tortious interference with a prospect is a rejection of liability 
based exclusively on the defendant’s motive.111 
Courts instead focus on the means employed by a defendant in interfering 
with the identified prospective economic advantage. The jurisprudence on 
this topic reveals four principal categories of activities that qualify as 
actionable under the tort.112 
The first is independently unlawful means, which includes behavior that, on 
its own—i.e., independent of tortious interference with a prospect—is 
actively proscribed by the law’s directives. These directives encompass not 
just criminal law prohibitions, but also relational directives that emanate from 
tort law.113 Included in this category are “violence, threats or intimidation, 
bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, 
duress, undue influence, misuse of insider or confidential information, [and] 
. . . breach of a fiduciary relationship.”114 Given that in these situations, a 
plaintiff ordinarily has recourse to an alternative claim for the defendant’s 
actions; courts often try to ensure that the tortious interference with a 
prospect claim is not redundant before allowing the action to proceed.115 
The second category encompasses conditionally unlawful means. It covers 
behavior by the defendant that is unlawful in the abstract, but is nonetheless 
 
108 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 639 (“At one time judges stood ready to impose tort 
liability for ordinary business decisions . . . if a bad motive was perceived.”). 
109 Id. 
110 For a discussion of this distinction, see id. § 625. 
111 See, e.g., Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 
tort of interference with business relationships should be confined to cases in which the defendant 
employed unlawful means to stiff a competitor.”); Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 
F.2d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring that the means used rise to the level of “wrongfulness”); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001) (requiring that the means be 
“independently tortious or unlawful”). 
112 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, §§ 627–29. 
113 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945-
46 (2010) (“[T]orts are a special kind of legal wrong not only because they are injury-inclusive or 
realized wrongs but also because they are relational wrongs.”). 
114 Duggin v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (Va. 1987). 
115 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 627 (“Where the plaintiff ’s claim falls within the realm of a 
specific tort, however, the rules of that tort should ordinarily control and the overlapping claim for 
interference with contract should be disregarded as surplusage.”). 
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not actionable by the plaintiff. This nonactionability must however be a 
consequence of a defect unrelated to the defendant’s conduct (e.g., standing 
or the statute of limitations) rather than one going directly to such conduct.116 
Thus, a defendant’s fraudulent behavior toward a third party, which interferes 
with a plaintiff ’s prospect, might be actionable by the third party—but not 
the plaintiff—rendering it conditionally unlawful.117 On the other hand, when 
the claim is defeated because a constitutive element of the tort is not satisfied, 
this affects the plaintiff ’s claim as well. The same is true of defenses that the 
defendant could raise to defeat the claim to a third party.118 Since such a 
defense eliminates wrongdoing altogether, the plaintiff cannot continue to 
claim that the defendant’s behavior was unlawful. 
It is not only unlawful behavior of the defendant that qualifies as 
actionable wrongdoing for tortious interference with a prospect. Lawful 
behavior too, behavior that the law does not directly proscribe, can qualify 
under certain circumstances. The third and fourth categories represent this 
reality. The third category is therefore behavior that is lawful but legally 
discouraged. It covers behavior that does not give rise to an independent 
cause of action but nonetheless is discouraged by the spirit of the law, or 
through the law’s additional requirements.119 Making intentionally false 
statements represents an example. While a fraudulent misrepresentation 
ordinarily vitiates a contract, it is hardly independently actionable when 
made to a stranger.120 All the same, few would disagree that it is actively 
discouraged by the law. 
The fourth category moves farther away from the law and represents 
situations that are lawful but unethical. This category is the most nebulous to 
police, and usually covers behavior that is inappropriate owing to the 
existence of a strong norm or custom to the contrary.121 The source of that 
norm then becomes an independent variable that the plaintiff must prove, 
something that courts approach with varying degrees of comfort.122 
 
116 See Kraemer v. Harding, 976 P.2d 1160, 1170 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (barring plaintiff ’s claim 
because of the statute of limitations). For a clear statement, see Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 n.11 (Or. 1978) (“[I]n a claim of improper interference with plaintiff ’s 
contractual relations, it is not necessary to prove all the elements of liability for another tort if those 
elements that pertain to the defendant’s conduct are present.”). 
117 See Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc., 582 Pd. 2d at 1371 n.11. 
118 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 628. 
119 Id. § 629 (putting “economic duress,” “undue influence,” and claims for “restitution” in 
this category). 
120 Id. 
121 See, e.g., RTL Distrib., Inc. v. Double S Batteries, Inc., 545 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1996) (noting how liability can be “premised on a violation of recognized ethical rules or established 
customs or practices in the business community”). 
122 For a reluctance to accept this category, see Speakers of Sport, Inc. 178 F.3d at 867 (“[T]he 
established standards of a trade or profession in regard to competition, and its ideas of unethical 
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In summary then, the element of wrongful “interference” encompasses a 
wide range of defendant behavior, beginning with overtly criminal actions to 
those that violate various ethical/customary norms. Much of the reason for 
this variation derives from the inverse correlation that the law recognizes, 
between the certainty underlying the prospective economic opportunity and 
the amount of wrongdoing required. 
C. Underlying Rationale(s) 
Tortious interference with a prospect has received somewhat scarce 
normative analysis from scholars ever since its origins. Scholarly analyses 
have instead focused principally on inducement of breach (i.e., tortious 
interference with a contract), with several of the arguments therein carrying 
over well to tortious interference with a prospect.123 A review of this limited 
literature as well as courts’ jurisprudence applying the tort, reveals three 
interrelated justifications for the action. 
1. Economic Justifications: Incentives and Deterrents 
One justification attempts to understand tortious interference in 
principally economic terms, despite its conflict with the ideal of efficient 
breach.124 The best known account of this justification is seen in the work of 
Lillian BeVier.125 In her account, the tort functions as a deterrent against free 
riding in cases that involve the acquisition or production of contract- (or 
prospect-) specific information by a promisee (i.e., the potential plaintiff).126 
In numerous commercial situations, one party—the promisee, or the one with 
 
competitive conduct, are likely to reflect a desire to limit competition for reasons related to the self-
interest of the trade or profession rather than to the welfare of its customers or clients.”). 
123 See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 23, §§ 638–42; Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is 
Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1175, 1177 (1996) (“One of two strands of scholarship on the tort . . . focuses on the case where a stranger 
induces someone to breach a clear cut contract obligation.”); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference 
with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1999) 
(“[T]he interference tort is an affront to the efficient-breach model.”); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference 
with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 
61, 64 (1982) (describing how the tort of intentional interference was applied “to a variety of contracts 
and . . . to prospective relationships not yet formalized into contract”). 
124 For more on this conflict, see Perlman, supra note 123; see also Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading 
Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100 
(2000) (noting that “[e]ven if the theory [of efficient breach] were sound, it is clearly wrong to say 
that the law does not want to deter efficient breaches”). 
125 Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 886 (1990) (“A second 
reason to focus attention on inducement is that the inducement facts starkly pose the apparent 
conflict between tort rules that impose liability for contractual interference and contract norms that 
celebrate the movement of resources to higher valuing users.”). 
126 Id. at 899. 
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the potential prospect—invests significantly in the acquisition of information 
that is highly specific to that prospect/contract and therefore without acceptable 
substitutes.127 As an example of such a scenario, BeVier identifies “a contract to 
purchase controlling shares in a corporation.”128 The process involves the 
collection and analysis of information specific to that particular corporation. 
In such “returns-to-information” cases, liability for intentional 
interference with a prospect functions as an ex ante incentive for the 
information-gathering party to invest into the collection and production of 
information.129 A third party that now seeks to intentionally interfere with 
the contract/prospect is in an important sense freeriding on the information 
procured by the promisee. BeVier underscores this last point by highlighting 
the tort’s emphasis on a defendant’s knowledge of the contract/prospect. If 
the third party values the prospect more highly than the investing promisee, 
the third party can initiate a transaction with the promisee or invest into the 
production of information on its own.130 Yet, by interfering with the 
promisee’s prospect, with knowledge of its existence and likely realization, 
the third party is clearly seeking to reduce its own costs to realize the same 
market outcome as the promisee.131 Tortious liability in these circumstances 
discourages freeriding by third parties, renders the information produced 
appropriable by the investor, and supports the overall incentive to invest in 
the production of information. 
This account of tortious interference mimics the logic of some unfair 
competition claims, where the unfairness of a defendant’s actions is seen to lie in 
its reliance on the prior efforts of a plaintiff–competitor, principally to lower its 
own costs.132 The problem with the freeriding in these scenarios is less about the 
circumvention of a potential market transaction, and more with the defendant’s 
ability to compete on more favorable terms by avoiding the costly investment 
made by the plaintiff. It is thus analytically independent of any need to treat the 
investment/information as an independent asset (i.e., as an object of ownership). 
 
127 Id. at 899-900. 
128 Id. at 899. 
129 Id. at 916. 
130 Id. at 919-20. 
131 Id. 
132 As an instance of such an argument, see Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47, 
52 (D. Idaho 1962), where the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s retransmission of a broadcaster’s 
signals was an interference with its own exclusive contract with the broadcaster. The essence of the 
plaintiff ’s argument was that the defendant—by avoiding the payment of a license fee to the 
broadcaster—was competing unfairly owing to its own lower costs. The district court allowed the 
tortious interference claim, and expressly equated it with an unfair competition cause. Id. at 58 
(“[T]he same result has been accomplished upon grounds of unfair competition in cases dealing with 
radio and television programs.”). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, principally on grounds of 
federal preemption. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1964). 
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What is also important to appreciate in this account is that it quite accurately 
recognizes the incentive—to collect and produce prospect-specific information—
as originating in the promisee’s own assessments of the market and its value. 
Protection against freeriding by a third party merely protects (or 
“increase[es]”)133 the incentive, and is hardly the origin/source of it. Independent 
of the promisee’s own belief (rational or otherwise) of the information being 
economically valuable, the mere existence of potential liability is quite incapable 
of incentivizing the production and collection of information. 
2. Commercial Morality 
A second rationale derives from the logic of early unfair competition 
claims, and focuses on the tort’s requirement that the defendant’s actions be 
independently improper/wrongful. In its focus on the means employed by the 
defendant in bringing about the interference, tortious interference with a 
prospect is seen as a mechanism of enforcing the prevailing norms of 
acceptable interaction among competitors in the market. 
This rationale tracks the role of the “improper means” requirement in the 
law of trade secrets, which similarly focuses on the propriety of a defendant’s 
behavior in acquiring the trade secret in question.134 And within that setting, 
courts have attempted to understand the requirement as enabling the law to 
convert the customary norms of commercial morality into legally enforceable 
standards.135 Indeed, the Restatement defines “improper means” as those that 
“fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality.”136 
Maintaining the standards of “commercial ethics” is therefore seen as an 
independently defensible goal for the law’s focus on the propriety of a 
commercial defendant’s market actions, both within the law of trade secrets 
and the tortious interference.137 In one well-known trade secret case where a 
defendant had obtained information about a competitor’s industrial plant 
through surreptitious aerial photography, the court had the following to say 
about the means employed by the defendant and the law’s commitment to 
commercial morality: 
We introduce here no new or radical ethic since our ethos has never given 
moral sanction to piracy. The market place must not deviate far from our 
mores. We should not require a person or corporation to take unreasonable 
 
133 BeVier, supra note 125, at 920. 
134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). 
135 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The maintenance of 
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies 
behind trade secret law.”). 
136 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f. (1939). 
137 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481. 
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precautions to prevent another from doing that which he ought not do in the 
first place . . . . “Improper” will always be a word of many nuances, 
determined by time, place, and circumstances. We therefore need not 
proclaim a catalogue of commercial improprieties. Clearly, however, one of 
its commandments does say “thou shall not appropriate a trade secret through 
deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not 
reasonably available.”138 
The reference to morality here certainly does not suggest that the 
rationale is imbued with a deontic character. It is instead deeply instrumental 
in orientation, and related to the recognition that industry norms and 
customs present an effective (and occasionally, efficient) method of rule 
development and coordination.139 
The commercial morality rationale embodies its own set of deep-seated 
problems. Scholars have criticized the ideal as being too vague and 
amorphous, and therefore unpredictable and ill-defined.140 Additionally, to 
the extent that it seeks to build on existing custom and convert those norms 
into legally enforceable standards, it partakes of the myriad problems and 
concerns that accompany the production and policing of customary law in 
different settings.141 Perhaps most importantly though, when treated as a 
freestanding rationale for tortious interference with a prospect, the 
commercial morality argument effectively collapses the tort into just another 
claim for unfair competition, with little regard for the tort’s emphasis on 
policing the boundaries of a protectable prospect. To the extent that it is 
capable of functioning as a justification then, it must do so in conjunction 
with other, more far-reaching, accounts. 
3. Actual/Ostensible Ownership 
A third plausible justification for tortious interference with a prospect 
attempts to convert its analytical basis into a normative theory. Recall that 
 
138 E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1970). 
139 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. 
L. REV. 241, 294 (1998) (noting that “norms that survive the test of time are likely to be efficient”). 
140 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 311, 322 (2008) (describing the tort theory as flawed because courts would be “unable to 
resolve those challenges on any principled basis, instead making ad hoc judgments based on 
perceptions of the defendant’s intent”); Bone, supra note 139, at 295-96 (finding that “the argument 
for trade secret law based on industry norms is weak” because “the argument only works for norms 
that are actually accepted” and because “[f]or an industry norm to exist, it must be part of a relatively 
stable industry-wide equilibrium”). 
141 See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1899, 1909 (2007) (“[T]here has been little acknowledgement of the breadth of the customary 
practices and norms involved in IP and the vast influence that they wield.”). 
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courts developing the tort in its early stages openly acknowledged that its 
effect was to convert a contractual entitlement into an in rem obligation 
against third parties.142 The normative variant of this description would argue 
that tortious interference identifies a prospect as an appropriable/ownable 
asset, which it then protects with a tailored exclusionary framework. In other 
words, the rationale for the exclusionary regime created by the tort is the 
ownership of the underlying prospect by the plaintiff. 
A version of this justification is seen in the work of Richard Epstein, on the 
inducement of breach.143 Justifying tortious interference with a contract as an 
effort to solve the problem of ostensible ownership, Epstein argues that the 
action exists to “fill the void that the more traditional notions of property may 
not reach.”144 The root of his argument derives from the recognition that 
ownership of labor is just as defensible and unproblematic as ownership of 
physical resources.145 From that basic idea, Epstein’s account then finds it 
straightforward to show that tortious interference works in identical manner as 
tort claims designed to protect against interferences with physical property.146 
In his analysis however, Epstein distinguishes between interference with 
a contract and interference with a prospect, suggesting that the latter is 
fundamentally different as a normative matter, and interestingly enough, 
easier to justify in property terms.147 His reasoning for this is that “one tort 
falls squarely within the traditional prohibition against force and fraud while 
the other does not.”148 Since interferences with a contract are often treated as 
cases of “inducement,” Epstein seems to be suggesting that tortious 
interference with a prospect—rather than a contract—is indeed more 
straightforward, insofar as it purports to set up a standard form of protection 
against force and fraud. Actual rather than ostensible ownership is thus at the 
heart of tortious interference with a prospect, in Epstein’s propertarian 
account. While inducement of breach derives from gap-filling in the skein of 
 
142 Temperton v. Russell (No.2), (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 730 (Eng.). 
143 Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1987) (determining that “[t]he tort of inducement of breach of contract is best 
understood as an unsuspected manifestation of the problem of ostensible ownership”). For a 
different version of the property argument, premised on first possession instead of self-ownership, 
see Fine, supra note 27, at 1139-42. Fine provides a more direct defense using property terms, 
especially as it relates to prospects rather than contracts, by treating prospects as an interest in a 
pursuit, which the rules of first acquisition seem to protect. Fine’s underlying normative logic 
however appears to be the equivalence in economic value being protected in both situations. Unlike 
Epstein, Fine does not go beneath the rules of pursuit to discern an underlying justification for them 
in the way in which Epstein does with ownership, albeit through Locke. 
144 Epstein, supra note 143, at 19-20. 
145 Id. at 20. 
146 Id. at 21-29. 
147 Id. at 21. 
148 Id. 
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standard property entitlements, tortious interference with a prospect appears 
as a straightforward instantiation of ownership principles.149 Epstein makes 
this abundantly clear when he concedes that in contrast to inducement of 
breach, which cannot be fitted into the standard mode, “the basic justification 
of the tort [of interference with a prospect] remains clear precisely because 
of the close connection between this class of economic losses and ordinary 
physical damages cases.”150 A protectable prospect is therefore just like any 
other ownable res. 
But why? The argument appears to place primary reliance on the 
conceptual structure of the interference tort and its resemblance to traditional 
property torts. Indeed, Epstein has adopted the same argument to suggest 
that “intangible” forms of property such as patent and copyright are property 
rights analogous to tangible property owing to a common conceptual 
structure.151 The justification for treating a prospect as a res is therefore rooted 
in the analytical structure of the doctrine, and not vice versa. A similar move 
is to be seen in work by another scholar, who also seeks to offer a property-
based justification for tortious interference based on an analogy to property 
law’s rules of first possession and the pursuit of animals.152 The conceptual 
similarities in the doctrinal regimes (notice, privilege of pursuit, motive, etc.) 
are treated as generating a normative claim for treating tortious interference 
as a property tort. 
The shortcomings of this approach are but obvious. The conceptual and 
analytical similarity (of tortious interference) to property sheds important 
light on the working of the tort doctrine and suggests that it might well be less 
of anomaly than some others have made it out to be. Yet, the idea of property 
as such (or of other economic interests such as a “right to trade”153) are hardly 
justifications on their own right, and require the elucidation of additional 
normative criteria underlying their working.154 “Property” is itself a thick 
 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 425 (1975) (arguing that 
patents and copyrights “create property rights” and “share the essential features of tangible 
property”); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response 
to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 458 (2010) (“[H]uge returns lie from systematizing 
intellectual property by analogy and extension to successful legal regimes elsewhere.”). 
152 See Fine, supra note 27, at 1135-39. 
153 Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 151, at 425 (“Bowen’s version of the prima facie tort also 
requires us to give an accurate account of the interest in trade to be equated with an interest in property.”). 
154 For an early recognition of the idea that property is a concept in need of justification, see 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 491 (L.A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch eds. 
1978) (1739) (describing the relationship between an individual and his property as “not natural, but 
moral, and founded on justice”). 
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analytic concept,155 embodying myriad normative goals within its working, 
many of which are both incommensurable and conflicting. 156 As such then, it 
has little to offer as a justification for tortious interference. In addition, the 
account cannot capture the nuance underlying the law’s policing of the 
prospect and the emphasis that it places on the relationship between prospect 
and wrongdoing; nuances and distinctions that Epstein is perfectly willing to 
ignore.157 At its root then, the property-based account simplistically converts 
an analogy into a normative justification, without any additional groundwork. 
One important observation about this account is in order before moving 
on. Unlike the two prior justifications for tortious interference with a 
prospect, the ownership rationale embodies a strong non-consequentialist 
component, especially insofar as it takes shape from within the idea of the 
independent morality and defensibility of ownership, which are seen as 
requiring no further normative defense. As we move to copyright, it is not 
altogether uncommon to see similar arguments at work in explanations of 
different parts of the system. 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH A PROSPECT 
Having examined the basic underpinnings of tortious interference with 
a prospect, this Part moves to explicating the homology between the action 
and copyright law. Section II.A begins with an overview of what a 
“homology” entails in legal theory and why it differs from an ordinary 
comparison. II.B then analyzes the commonality of pluralist normative 
considerations that coexist within both institutions and routinely motivate 
their functioning. II.C then provides a brief overview of copyright’s basic 
structure of rights, liability, and privileges, and develops the homology more 
fully by analyzing copyright’s most salient doctrinal elements through 
tortious interference with a prospect. 
A. Homology as Interpretive Legal Theory 
As noted previously, the distinction between an analogy and a homology 
is subtle yet distinct. An analogy is a mere explanatory comparison between 
two ideas or concepts; while a homology does more. A homology compares 
 
155 Thick concepts are generally understood as those that embody an evaluative content, and 
require further normative criteria for their working. See generally Simon Kirchin, Introduction: Thick 
and Thin Concepts, in THICK CONCEPTS 1 (Simon Kirchin ed., 2013). 
156 See generally J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996). 
157 See Epstein, supra note 143, at 21 n.60 (“The Restatement’s total lack of form is attributable 
in large measure to its effort to sweep too many disparate cases into a single rule.”). 
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two ideas or concepts, but in addition purports to identify a “fundamental 
truth” about their commonality that connects them in a way that is 
significantly stronger than a superficial structural resemblance.158 A 
commonality in origin/evolution is usually the basis of a homology.159 Such 
commonality in origin need not, however, relate merely to source. It can 
instead be a shared normative basis that influences the construction of the two 
ideas or concepts under study, which is of special applicability in legal 
comparisons. When a shared set of normative values accounts for a 
commonality in the analytical structure of legal rules or principles, the 
resemblance between the rules or principles may be appropriately 
characterized as a homology rather than an analogy. 
In this understanding then, good swaths of what is often described as 
analogical reasoning in the law may indeed partake of a homology, insofar as 
it is driven by a purported identification of a common causal story or origin 
that is distinctively normative in orientation.160 As an example, consider the 
manner in which the “implied warranty of habitability” evolved.161 In a well-
known case, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,162 Judge Skelly Wright of the 
D.C. Circuit developed the idea through a comparison with the “implied 
warranty of merchantability,” in turn a staple doctrine in the law of 
contracts.163 Clearly to him, the structure of both warranties had to be similar, 
i.e., they both had to be implied in every contract and nonwaivable. The 
decision to model one on the other—i.e., to render them structurally 
similar—was driven by a common set of normative considerations, despite 
the differing contexts. And these were the obvious information asymmetry 
 
158 See 5 CONG. OF ARTS AND SCI., UNIVERSAL EXPOSITION 350 (Howard J. Rogers ed. 1906). 
159 Id. at 350-51. 
160 See EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-6 (1949) (describing 
the centrality of analogical reasoning to legal argument because it “accepts the differences of view 
and ambiguities of words”); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON 19-27 (2d ed. 2016) 
(summarizing cases where the court drew on analogy to interpret a statute and finding no evidence 
of “any general rule from which the controlling analogies can be derived”); Scott Brewer, Exemplary 
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 923, 962-66 (1996) (“[A]rgument by analogy works by comparing two items and by inferring 
from the fact that these items share some properties that they share some further property . . . .”); 
Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1179-83 (1999) 
(describing a judge’s application of analogical reasoning as “survey[ing] past decisions, 
identify[ing] ways in which these decisions are similar to or different from each other . . . and 
develop[ing] a principle that captures the similarities and differences”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743-49 (1993) (stating that 
analogical reasoning requires “some principle, harmonizing seemingly disparate outcomes” in order 
to produce consistency within the law). 
161 See Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New 
Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1445-46 (1974). 
162 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
163 Id. at 1075-77. 
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between the contracting parties and the gross disparity in bargaining position 
during their market interaction. The similarity was thus more than just 
structural and may be explained by a common evolutionary account grounded 
in the goals that motivated both doctrines. 
As an example from within copyright jurisprudence, consider the 
Supreme Court’s development of “vicarious liability” for copyright 
infringement in the case of Sony v. Universal City Studios.164 Recognizing it to 
be a case of first impression, the Court referenced the “historic kinship” 
between patent and copyright law to justify its reliance on patent law 
jurisprudence to develop a structurally similar doctrine for copyright law.165 
The Court’s logic here quite clearly had more to it than just the fact that 
copyright and patent were both forms of intellectual property. It was instead 
steeped in the recognition that both emanated from the same constitutional 
source, which in turn specified a common normative goal for both 
institutions: “promoting the Progress,” a goal that needed to produce similar 
outcomes in both regimes through the use of similar principles.166 
The distinction between a homology and an analogy may be better 
understood through an idea made famous by the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: “family resemblances.”167 Wittgenstein identified a network of 
similarities in sets of ideas–concepts, and argued that instead of abstracting 
to a set of common or universal characters that are used to define the set, one 
should better understand its constituent elements as embodying a sequential 
chain of commonalities.168 In this construction, not every member of the set 
would embody all the common characteristics, but each would instead be 
directly related to another and the set as a whole would thus compose of 
individual units that are all so directly related in some way. He called this the 
idea of “family resemblance” and it has since spawned an immense amount of 
secondary literature.169 
 
164 464 U.S. 417, 434-39 (1984). 
165 Id. at 439. For a critique of the Court’s approach, claiming that the argument was poorly 
reasoned and researched, see Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
941 (2007). By pointing to the Court’s use of the argument here, I am certainly not suggesting that it 
was correctly applied; merely that it represents an instance of a homology rather than a pure analogy. 
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
167 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §67 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1st ed. 1953). 
168 Id. § 65-66. 
169 See, e.g., Michael Forster, Wittengstein on Family Resemblance Concepts, in WITTGENSTEIN’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS: A CRITICAL GUIDE 66 (Arif Ahmed ed., 2010) (clarifying 
common misconceptions about the concept of family resemblance); Renford Bambrough, Universals 
and Family Resemblances, Meeting of the Aristotelian Society (May 8, 1961), 61 PROC. 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 207, 207-22 (1960) (arguing that family resemblance solved “the problem of 
universals”); Keith Campbell, Family Resemblance Predicates, 2 AM. PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1965) 
(refusing Wittgenstein’s theory to eliminate contradictions and errors as applied to predicates); 
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Of importance to us though is the reality that Wittgenstein’s idea of family 
resemblance quite consciously conflates two core elements, both of which set 
a homology apart from an analogy. The philosopher Hans Sluga has identified 
this conflation most concretely in recent work, in the process shedding 
important light indirectly on the homology–analogy distinction.170 Sluga 
points out that the idea of family resemblance confuses two analytically 
distinct ideas. The first is what he calls the “similarity concept,” and represents 
the epistemically verifiable similarity, correspondence, or identity between the 
subjects under study.171 This is a structural reality, so to speak. The second is 
what he calls a “kinship concept,” or the existence of some “appropriate causal 
connection” between the subjects.172 Kinship concepts, to Sluga, are important 
insofar as they are critical to establishing “direct and real connections, causal 
links, dependencies and ‘influences’” between subjects of study.173 
Homologies actively embody this idea of a kinship conception between 
structurally similar objects. They combine in no small measure both elements, 
since the object of the comparison is driven by a desire to establish some 
relationship between the subjects being studied. Sluga’s use of the idea of a 
“causal” connection identifies such a relationship rather broadly. Indeed, a 
common normative consideration or motivation is analytically sufficient to 
establish a common cause, i.e., that both ideas were caused by—or, brought 
into existence because of—the same goals at issue. Mere analogies thus focus 
principally on the similarity concept and less on the causal dimension, while 
homologies embody both. 
In his elucidation of this distinction, Sluga also makes an additional 
observation of relevance. He notes that the relationship between the similarity 
and kinship concepts is oftentimes reflexive.174 In other words, a comparison 
that begins using a similarity concept will sometimes assume a kinship 
dimension and vice versa. Indeed, this has been shown to be true as an 
 
Heather J. Gert, Family Resemblances and Criteria, 105 SYNTHESE 177, 177 (1995) (arguing against an 
interpretation of family resemblance and proposing an alternate understanding); Nicholas Griffin, 
Wittgenstein, Universals and Family Resemblances, 3 CAN. J. PHIL. 635, 635-36 (1974) (discussing 
whether Wittgenstein’s family resemblance solves the problem of universals); Pamela Huby, Family 
Resemblance, 18 PHIL. Q. 66, 66 (1968) (arguing that family resemblance is not a theory, but a 
repudiation of other theories); J.E. Llewelyn, Discussions, Family Resemblance, 18 PHIL. Q. 344, 344 
(1968) (discussing family resemblance in regard to the function and use of “general words”); 
Anthony Manser, Games and Family Resemblances, 42 PHIL. 210, 224 (1967) (finding family 
resemblance of “little assistance in dealing with . . . ‘the problem of universals’”). 
170 See Hans Sluga, Family Resemblance, 71 GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN 1, 14 (2006) 
(“It is problematic in that [family resemblance’s] characterization draws on two quite different sets 
of ideas, two different vocabularies but treats them as if they were one and the same.”). 
171 Id. at 15. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 19. 
174 Id. at 19-20. 
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empirical matter as well.175 When two things are revealed to have a common 
source/motivation, they begin to appear more similar to otherwise neutral 
observers. Homologies are therefore by definition interpretive in character. 
As Dworkin famously pointed out, legal reasoning—as interpretive 
reasoning—involves more than just an attempt to neutrally understand a 
concept. Theorizing about the law additionally embodies an effort to make 
sense of a legal doctrine, rule or institution by “see[ing] it in its best light.”176 
This derives from the recognition that the doctrine or institution is not a 
mere artifact, but is instead motivated by some principle or purpose and 
sensitive to that principle or purpose.177 Owing to this motivation/sensitivity 
combination, theorizing about a legal institution becomes a value laden 
enterprise, wherein the reasons for an institution or doctrine influence an 
appreciation of its salient features.178 Going back to Sluga, this implies that 
homological reasoning in the law will to some degree allow the kinship 
concept to influence its construction of the similarity concept, a reality that 
should be acknowledged. The identification of a normative goal or underlying 
principle will cause some similarities or dissimilarities to be emphasized over 
others, with the recognition that this is inevitable (since otherwise, the two 
subjects under comparison would be identical). 
This Part offers such a homological account. The account begins with an 
identification of normative commonality between tortious interference with 
a prospect and copyright law to show that the two are routinely justified by 
reference to a common set of principles, even in the face of deep contestation 
over the relative importance of these principles within that set. It then 
proceeds to show how, once these principles are accepted as common, several 
of copyright’s salient—and functionally significant—attributes might be 
better (or best) understood through the lens of tortious interference with a 
prospect to “see it in its best light.” 
B. Incentives, Property, and Market Morality: Common Goals 
As discussed previously, tortious interference with a prospect is justified 
by reference to three different normative ideals.179 The ex ante economic 
 
175 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging 
Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 279-81 (2014) (finding that lay subjects observe greater similarity 
between objects when told that one was copied from the other). 
176 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986). 
177 Id. at 46-48 (explaining the two components of the “interpretive attitude,” which are (i) 
that a legal rule serves a purpose and is intended to achieve that purpose, and (ii) that the rules that 
embody a legal doctrine can evolve in order to serve that purpose). 
178 Id. at 90 (“General theories of law . . . must be abstract because they aim to interpret the 
main point and structure of legal practice.”). 
179 See supra Section I.C. 
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explanation sees it as essential to allowing a market participant (i.e., a 
prospective contracting party) to invest into the collection of prospect-
specific information by deterring freeriding by a competitor;180 the moral 
explanation treats it as affirming a set of market norms and customs that are 
required by a well-functioning market;181 and the property explanation treats 
the prospect as akin to a property interest and therefore deserving of 
exclusionary protection in its own right.182 The crucial point to remember 
about these various justifications for the tort is that, despite their divergence 
and varied normative inclinations, they each continue to subsist in the 
working of the doctrine, and find validation in one or more elements of the 
action. The ex ante perspective focuses on the intentional (or notice-driven) 
aspects of the tort, the moral one on the tort’s focus on improper behavior, 
and the propertarian one on the in rem nature of the action. Each of the three 
explanations is therefore, in a sense, incapable of complete invalidation as 
long as the tort retains its basic structure. 
With copyright, we see something very similar. On the one hand, we 
encounter nearly identical normative justifications for the institution. On the 
other, we find all of them continuing to thrive and find partial validation in 
some part of the system. In both, we therefore encounter a parallel normative 
pluralism that has failed to ever impede the actual functioning (and 
application) of the legal regime. 
Copyright’s ex ante justification is also incentives-driven, and is today the 
institution’s principal justification.183 Beginning with the premise that 
copyright exists in order to “promote the progress” of the sciences and useful 
arts—an avowedly utilitarian goal—the incentives account posits that 
copyright law is designed to realize this goal—and therefore enhance overall 
social welfare—by inducing creators to produce creative work through the 
promise of temporally limited and narrowly tailored market exclusivity.184 
The regime’s guarantee of a private action for an interference with such 
exclusivity is believed to contribute to the very production and dissemination 
 
180 See supra subsection I.C.1. 
181 See supra subsection I.C.2. 
182 See supra subsection I.C.3. 
183 See Balganesh, Foreseeability, supra note 10, at 1576-77 (“Copyright law is thus thought to 
exist primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate 
their works publicly.”); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 
658 (2006) (“[T]he first orthodoxy of modern copyright [is that] [b]y granting more rights to 
authors, copyright law provides them with more incentive to create . . . .”). 
184 See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 71-73 (2014) 
(“The dominant American theory of copyright law is utilitarian, in offering the incentive of limited 
copyright protection to creators to generate material that is valuable to society.”); Christopher 
Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 317 (2009) (“[T]he 
dominant justification for copyright, at least in the United States, is explicitly utilitarian.”). 
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of creative expression.185 This incentives argument dominates courts’ rhetoric 
about the reasons for the copyright system, and is often touted as a reason for 
individual decisionmaking as well, within the functioning of copyright.186 
Much like with tortious interference, a good part of copyright’s incentive is 
seen as connected to the deterrent effect that the regime has on freeriding 
(which it renders actionable).187 
The market morality explanation within copyright, while infrequently 
advanced, nonetheless informs certain parts of the system.188 In this 
conception, aspects of the copyright system operate as rules of “trade 
regulation” by proscribing specific forms of actionable copying, which is seen 
as anti-competitive or contrary to accepted market practices.189 Much as with 
tortious interference, this explanation has had fairly limited traction as a 
stand-alone explanation for the entire regime and has been relegated to 
specific domains of copyright’s doctrinal structure.190 Nonetheless, it 
maintains a role within a part of the overall system. 
The property-based explanation on the other hand, is probably second 
only to the incentives argument in its influence on copyright thinking.191 In 
this argument, copyright law creates a property interest in the work that it 
then envelopes in a regime of exclusivity. The basis—and rationale—for that 
property interest are either secondary or irrelevant once brought into 
existence, much as the property arguments for tortious interference assume. 
The property justification for copyright dates back to the very origins of 
copyright and the idea that the system is designed to protect an ownership 
interest in the same way that regular property law protects similar interests 
 
185 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of 
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1666-67 (2012). 
186 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[T]he limited [monopoly] grant . . . is intended to motivate the creative 
activity of authors . . . .”). 
187 Balganesh, supra note 185, at 1679. 
188 For a good overview, see James Grimmelmann, The Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2014-31 (2009) (documenting some of these moral norms as constitutive 
of copyright’s modern ethical vision). 
189 See id. at 2009 (noting that “[c]ourts look to commercial customs to learn what practices 
are considered unethical”); see also Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
899, 927-42 (2007). 
190 One such area, for instance, is the analysis of potential market harm under the fourth fair 
use factor. 17 U.S.C. §107(4) (2012). For a general discussion of courts’ proscription of practices that 
violate customary industry practice, see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in 
Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1937-41 (2007). 
191 For a discussion of historical notions of property rights and creation incentives within 
copyright law, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 55 (2008). 
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in tangible assets.192 This vision of copyright is best characterized as 
“Blackstonian copyright” in that it looks no further than (or beneath) the 
owner’s despotic dominion to control access to the resource under protection, 
once brought into existence.193 While capable of coexisting with an economic 
argument, the two are nonetheless analytically distinct. Indeed, some scholars 
purport to defend the property justification as capable of existing 
independent of an economic rationale, in the recognition of the author’s 
inherent dignitary/personality interest that is being protected through the 
regime’s set of exclusive rights.194 
Each of the rationales offered for tortious interference with a prospect 
thus finds a strong parallel in copyright, both individually and as a 
collective. The foundational values that underlie them—efficiency, 
fairness, and ownership—each has an unmistakable parallel in the 
copyright setting. This is hardly to suggest that one evolved from the other 
or indeed was self-consciously modelled on the other. Instead, it provides 
evidence of the kind of “kinship” relationship that renders the similarity 
more than just of epistemic significance and suggests that the two might 
have useful lessons to learn from each other. 
It should therefore come as no surprise that some scholars writing about 
tortious interference have attempted to use the tort’s similarity to intellectual 
property in their arguments attempting to legitimize or undermine the 
continued expansion of tortious interference. Richard Epstein was the 
earliest to do so, in arguing that intellectual property provided the “prima 
facie tort” with a justification.195 A few years later, Dan Dobbs examined the 
same analogy as a potential justification for tortious interference (with an 
expectancy) and found it to be lacking, insofar as it was the basis for a simple 
property-driven justification for tortious interference.196 Very importantly 
 
192 See, e.g., Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 1511, at 457 (noting how, with unauthorized 
copying on the rise, “legal systems start[ed] to develop forms of copyright protection that echo[ed] 
. . . the constellation of property rights over tangible objects”). 
193 See NETANEL, supra note 191, at 8. See also Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1129-30 (crediting 
Blackstonian normative attitudes of property as helpful in the copyright context “to conjure up 
images of an owner’s absolute and unconditional right to exclude others from a resource”). 
194 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1997 (2006) (arguing for protection of moral rights “aimed 
at preserving an author’s dignity” in addition to copyright’s traditional exclusive rights, which “afford 
economic protection”). 
195 See Epstein, Intentional Harms, supra note 151, at 425 (analogizing the creation of property 
rights for intangible assets through copyright or patent to protection of trade). Much like Epstein, 
one other writer has drawn on intellectual property to explain tortious interference by suggesting 
that the analogy justifies the law’s willingness to recognize a property interest even without a 
heightened notice requirement. Fine, supra note 27, at 1133-34. 
196 Dobbs, supra note 55, at 352-55. Dobbs’ simplistic treatment of intellectual property as just 
another form of property does little justice to the complex normative goals underlying different 
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though, all of these accounts use intellectual property to try and justify 
tortious interference, and never the other way around. 
Both tortious interference and copyright law therefore remain motivated by 
the same confluence of complex normative goals. These goals may of course 
point in different directions, assume different color, and suggest different 
analytical devices when rendered operational. Yet they do suggest—at the very 
least—a plausible normative “kinship” between the two regimes. Even if Dobbs 
is correct that the similarity is not strong enough to independently justify the 
very existence of one by relying on the other, the normative kinship nonetheless 
points to lessons that they each might learn from similarity to the other, once 
both are presumptively justified (in their very existence). 
C. The Homology 
While the copyright statute is today characterized by multiple layers of 
regulatory complexity, the institution’s core apparatus remains fairly 
straightforward.197 Indeed, much of it has stayed constant ever since the 
origins of the institution in the eighteenth century. 
Stripped down to its essentials, copyright law protects original 
expression that qualifies as a work of authorship by creating a cause of action 
for a defined set of acts when not authorized by the copyright owner. 
Copyright realizes this structure through the creation of a set of “exclusive 
rights” to conduct or authorize certain activities using the protected work.198 
When another person performs those acts without the authorization of the 
copyright owner, those actions qualify as an “[i]nfringement” of the owner’s 
exclusive rights, i.e., of the copyright entitlement.199 Most importantly, as a 
regime of private law, merely because something qualifies as an 
infringement does not mean that it will be penalized.200 It is only when the 
copyright owner chooses to commence an action that the infringement 
becomes enforceable. 
 
intellectual property regimes. Indeed, from his description, one suspects that he sees little 
justification for the expansion of intellectual property, causing him to see its extension to tortious 
interference as doubly problematic. See id. at 354 (noting that the evolution of tortious interference 
has not proceeded with the same caution as patent law in granting monopolies or property rights). 
197 See, e.g., Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 94-100 (2004) (discussing the 
complexification of copyright’s regulatory structure compared to the previously simple common law 
framework, but noting that the changing law “retained, at its core, many aspects of the property 
rights model . . . . underlying the early copyright acts”). 
198 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
199 Id. §501(a) (2012). 
200 For a fuller account of this, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of 
Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1666-76 (2012); see also 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 771 (2013) 
(“[C]opyright law depends entirely on private enforcement via infringement suits.”). 
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Not every unauthorized act involving the protected work, however, 
need qualify as an infringement. Copyright law has multiple safety valves 
built into its entitlement delineation strategy. First, as part of the prima 
facie case, copyright usually requires establishing that the defendant 
engaged in the act of “copying.”201 Unsurprisingly, copying is more than 
just a factual question of appropriation202—it also embodies a normative 
dimension. Thus, even when a plaintiff establishes that the defendant 
appropriated content from the protected expression, the court must 
determine whether the copying was “wrongful” or “improper” as such for 
it to be actionable.203 This is a heavily evaluative inquiry involving a variety 
of factors.204 Second, copyright law also insists that wrongful actions of the 
defendant embody a “volitional” element, where the human agency 
involved can be discerned.205 With developments in technology, 
disaggregating the volition and automated parts of wrongful conduct has 
emerged as an important part of the inquiry, not just for the act of copying 
but for all putatively wrongful behavior that might qualify as 
infringement.206 Third, and perhaps most saliently, wrongful conduct does 
not qualify as infringement at all when the behavior is seen by the system 
as normatively privileged under the “fair use” doctrine.207 Even when 
protected, a defendant’s use of the work is on occasion seen as socially 
beneficial and therefore exempted from the gamut of infringement 
altogether. The behavior is in an important sense “privileged.”208 
Exclusivity, copying, volitional conduct, and contextually privileged 
behavior thus form the four basic conceptual cornerstones of the copyright 
system. Each of these elements may however be understood and interpreted 
through the lens of tortious interference with a prospect, which sheds light 
on the important principles seen in their functioning, and in turn allows 
them to be infused with additional analytical content. 
 
201 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“Absent copying there can be no infringement of 
copyright.”). 
202 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 
215 (2012) (explaining that copying is “both factual and normative,” and requires not only “the 
existence of actual copying” but also that the copying be “improper”). 
203 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946). 
204 Balganesh, supra note 2022, at 242-61 (discussing in depth the variables considered in the 
two step inquiry for substantial similarity). 
205 For an excellent recent discussion of the existing legal position and the conceptual 
confusion underlying the idea in copyright jurisprudence, see Robert C. Denicola, Volition and 
Copyright Infringement, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1259, 1270-84 (2016). 
206 Id. at 1284. See also id. at 1283-84 (discussing “the possibility of secondary liability for 
copyright infringement” based on factors like “knowledge, inducement, and financial gain” even if a 
court concluded that the defendant had a “lack of volition”). 
207 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
208 See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985). 
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1. The Market (for the Work) as Prospective Economic Advantage 
For quite some time now, copyright law has been deeply conflicted about 
the appropriate target of its protection. One conception, usually traced back 
to the very origins of the institution, focuses on the protection of the author 
and on the practice of “authorship” as central to copyright’s functioning.209 
This is believed to have manifested itself in the author-focused debates that 
eventually led to the passage of the first copyright statute in the English-
speaking world, the Statute of Anne.210 A second conception, which is 
believed to have gained prominence in the last few decades, instead focuses 
on the work, rather than the human agency which produces it.211 Authorship 
here becomes important only insofar as it is responsible for the production of 
the work, and not independently. The work in turn assumes a life of its own 
once brought into existence.212 Peter Jaszi argues that the focus on the work 
emerged in the mid-eighteenth century, when the “commercialization and 
commodification of print culture” grew.213 
Regardless of when the shift to a thing-like conception of the work 
emerged, it today continues to confound copyright reasoning.214 The doctrine 
of originality is a good example of an area where this problem persists. 
Originality is meant to operate as an assessment of the work’s creativity as well 
as a verification of the source of such creativity. A work is original if it exhibits 
a “modicum of creativity” and/that “owe[s] its origin” to the author claiming 
copyright.215 As is obvious, this construction conflates the precise target of 
the originality assessment. On the one hand, it appears to be the work, insofar 
 
209 See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 3-4 (1993). 
210 Id. at 31-48; see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 468-71 (outlining the debates surrounding and theory underlying 
the Statute of Anne). 
211 See Jaszi, supra note 210, at 472-80 (“[A doctrinal reversal] followed from the emergence of 
the ‘work’ concept as a new source of guidance and constraint in copyright, called forth by the 
inherent instability of the ‘authorship’ construct itself.”); see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS IN COURT: 
SCENES FROM THE THEATER OF COPYRIGHT 182-85 (2016) (“[B]oth the Statute of Anne and the 
U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 place authors and their works at the heart of copyright doctrine.”). 
212 See Jaszi, supra note 21010, at 477-80 (“[U]nfurling the banner of ‘authorship’ was completed 
through the legal objectification of the fruits of creative labor.”). 
213 Id. at 473. 
214 For a useful account, see Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work as We Know It, 19 J. 
INTELL. PROP. 325, 332 (2012) (“At times the work is what the author says it is, or what we 
understand the author to have intended; at times the work is what is original, or what is fixed in 
some tangible object . . . .”); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 35 (2017) (“The tasks of independently determining whether something was a ‘work of 
authorship’ and whether an actor was an ‘author’ began to recede in importance . . . .”). 
215 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-47, 363 (1991). 
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as any originality is meant to be assessed from the face of the work.216 On the 
other hand, it extends to the author, who must have some connection to the 
work and its original components for the originality to be authorial. The 
conflation is today crystallized in the Copyright Act, which defines its object 
of protection as a “work of authorship,” seemingly incorporating both the 
work and the author as the targets of protection.217 
Approaching the issue through tortious interference with a prospect 
produces an additional, and far more plausible, idea: modern copyright law’s 
real object of protection is neither the work (qua property), nor the author (qua 
actor). Instead, and to the extent that a utilitarian argument holds sway over 
American copyright thinking, the object of protection might be understood as 
the economic benefits offered by the potential market for the work at issue. 
This refocusing of emphasis is at once simple and of some significance. 
To begin with, it helps account for the reality that copyright has never in 
its history attempted to graft an exclusionary regime simply around the work, 
in the way that property law does for a tangible object.218 At the same time, 
neither has copyright law really ever engaged the idea of authorship or the 
construction of the author as a doctrinal matter.219 And yet, during the 
infringement analysis, in the fair use doctrine, and in its computation of 
damages, the prospective market for the work emerges as a functionally 
significant construct. The infringement analysis purports to examine the 
substitutionary effect of the defendant’s copying on the plaintiff ’s work,220 
while a central part of the four-factor fair use doctrine examines the effect of 
a defendant’s copying on the “potential market” for the work.221 Similarly, in 
 
216 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 
(2015) (“Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author 
. . . .”). 
217 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
218 See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 4 (1967). 
219 See Balganesh, supra note 2144, at 11-34; Jaszi, supra note 210, at 481-85 (“The objective test 
of copyrightability for derivative works proposed here—that they contain ‘distinguishable variations’ 
from the underlying works on which they are based—is one that focuses attention on the work, rather 
than its ‘author.’”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2003) (“[I]f authors are as central to copyright as I claim, I must also 
acknowledge that copyright doctrine on authorship, both here and abroad, is surprisingly sparse.”). 
220 The focus on the ordinary observer during the infringement analysis has been commonly 
understood as assessing whether the “intended audience”—representing the market for the work—
would find the two works at issue to be substitutes in their similarity to each other. For a judicial 
articulation, see Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990) (justifying the 
intended audience approach “[i]n light of the copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s 
market”); see also ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW § 3.2.2 (2014) (“Under the intended audience test, the court determines the 
subjective similarity between two works . . . from the perspective of the group that is the market for 
the work, that is, the work’s intended audience.”). 
221 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). 
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computing actual damages, copyright law allows a plaintiff to claim lost 
profits (from a market) as a measure of damage.222 Each of these doctrines 
therefore hints at a prospective market (for the work) being the true basis of 
protection. The idea also fits well with copyright’s modern focus on market 
incentives as its principal justification. 
Much like a prospective advantage that is protected against interference, 
the market for a protected work of expression remains a probabilistic 
entitlement. Its actual realization is far from certain; yet at the same time its 
occurrence evinces a degree of plausibility that the legal regime treats as 
sufficient to warrant protection. Recall that in the tortious interference 
context, courts have adopted the general position that the expectancy/prospect 
needs to be more than just a subjective speculation, but must instead have a 
reasonable possibility of being realized—both causally and contextually.223 To 
be sure, courts have generally disfavored mere “lost opportunit[ies]” as 
protectable prospects, especially when they are largely speculative and show 
no proof of a specific relationship.224 All the same, they have been willing to 
countenance lower probability expectancies when a compelling public policy 
reason required such encouragement.225 Transposing these to the market for a 
work suggests that parallels might be easy to locate. 
The very protectability of the work—in terms of the subject matter and 
the myriad criteria for copyrightability—implicate the system’s legitimate 
belief that the work embodies some market potential. Indeed, the very market-
based rationale of the copyright system, i.e., the idea that the logic of the 
market induces creative production, would be amiss if protectability did not 
correspond to a reasonable belief that the copyright system wants actors to 
rely on.226 It is of course another matter that the system’s criteria for 
protectability do not reflect an abiding concern with such market potential.227 
Additionally, the whole premise of copyright—traceable back to the 
Constitution—is that the inducement of creative works inures to the public 
good as a whole and “promot[es] the [p]rogress” of society.228 At its roots, a 
 
222 Id. § 504(b). 
223 See supra text accompanying notes 94–105. 
224 See, e.g., Blank v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 70 (Cal. 1985); Westside Ctr. Assocs. v. Safeway 
Stores 23, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 803 (Ct. App. 1996); Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 184 Cal. Rptr. 
317, 323 (Ct. App. 1982). 
225 See Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 735 (Cal. 1987) (indicating that protection of “the integrity 
of civil litigation” is one such compelling public policy reason). 
226 See Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, supra note 10, at 1573 (“[C]opyright 
exists primarily (if not entirely) to provide creators with an incentive to produce creative expression 
through the promise of limited exclusionary control over their creative work.”). 
227 Id. at 1581-89. (“Despite copyright being premised entirely on the idea of incentives, courts 
never look to its theory of incentives in delineating the scope and extent of a creator’s entitlement 
in individual cases.”). 
228 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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strong public interest pervades the very existence of copyright protection. The 
system is therefore set up with the idea that people should rely on it to realize 
this public purpose. This reality should then allow for significant leeway in the 
level of certainty demanded by the law for the protection of a prospect and 
should readily accommodate the idea of protectability being a useful proxy. 
Even if one accepts protectability as a good proxy for the prospect, the 
precise boundaries of that prospect will require some delineation since in 
theory the market for a work is boundless. Especially given that the copyright 
system is not trying to preclude all uses of the work (as patent law purports 
to), the market for the work—actual and prospective—will require 
independent specification even when reframed as a prospect. This might be 
achieved through the use of objective expectations (e.g., reasonable 
foreseeability229) or through a mechanism that is roughly similar to antitrust 
law’s “relevant market” determination.230 In either structuring, the device 
would seek to ensure that the market for the work—the protected prospect—
tracks the objectively reasonable expectations that a creator might have, 
rather than a purely subjective desire for a windfall. In crucial ways, such a 
process of delineation would represent a significant improvement over the 
current system, which delegates the determination of what the protected 
work is to the individual plaintiff instead of adopting an objective standard.231 
The recasting suggested here would enter the fray as a mechanism for 
tailoring the plaintiff ’s claim during an infringement action, rather than as a 
facet of copyrightability since it relates primarily to infringement rather than 
validity.232 The plaintiff ’s action—both by claim and remedy—would then be 
limited to unlawful interferences with the market that the court/law identifies 
as a reasonable expectation for the work at issue. The court would now have 
to examine whether the plaintiff ’s infringement claim pertains to a market 
benefit that constitutes a reasonable expectancy, i.e., whether it would have 
likely been realized/realizable by the plaintiff absent the defendant’s 
 
229 See Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, supra note 10, at 1603-25 (advancing a 
proposal that copyright infringement be limited to “foreseeable copying” in order to limit the scope 
of exclusive rights to the expected market). 
230 For the relevant market determination, see Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust 
Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 64 (1984) (“Courts should apply the 
protected interest, market transaction, burden-shifting orientation consistently in all cases involving 
relevant market definition.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 960-63 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and 
the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1813 (1990). 
231 See Paul Goldstein, What is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does it Matter?, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1175, 
1176-77 (2011) (“[A copyrighted] work is whatever the author says it is . . . . In the overwhelming 
majority of cases under the 1976 Act in which the copyrighted work determined, or at least influenced, 
the legal outcome, the court . . . simply rubber-stamped the author’s identification of his work.”). 
232 For a fuller discussion of the difference, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2204-14 (2016). 
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interference, similar to the inquiry in tortious interference with a prospect.233 
Its most direct application would likely be in relation to the reproduction and 
derivative works rights, where the boundaries of the market remain uncertain 
in practice.234 Thus an author of a computer software program would, for 
example, ordinarily be unable to claim infringement when an aesthetically 
pleasing part of that code is reproduced in an art work and framed as such, 
unless the author can prove that such an aesthetically-focused reproduction 
or derivative use of the work is a “reasonable” expectancy for literary works 
based on evidence of a licensing market/practice related to such uses. 
In addition to taking shape from the context of the work and associated 
market variables, the reasonableness of the expectancy would also be 
influenced by the overarching public policy motivating the regime, echoing 
the Court’s own “recognition that some works are closer to the core of 
intended copyright protection than others.”235 Purely factual, or minimally 
original works would thus have a narrower market domain, and conversely 
highly original works would obtain a broader scope of protection. In the 
abstract, this might seem like a complex task for courts to undertake; yet in 
practice, it has worked rather well in tortious interference and allowed courts 
to eliminate purely speculative claims from the system. 
2. Copying as Interference and Improper Means 
Not all uses of a protected work, however monetizable, amount to 
copyright infringement. Ever since its origins in the eighteenth century, 
copyright law has consciously chosen to avoid crafting its bundle of owners’ 
privileges in property-like terms. Some property scholars have described this 
as the copyright’s choice of a governance-based liability regime over a purely 
exclusion-driven one.236 As Ben Kaplan put it many decades ago, copyright’s 
set of exclusive rights focus on describing exclusive rights in “way[s] to 
replicate the work.”237 Copying therefore forms the principal form of action 
that copyright law treats as an actionable infringement. The Supreme Court 
put the point most profoundly and directly, when it emphasized that “[a]bsent 
 
233 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 638 (“The plaintiff ’s prospect or economic opportunity must be 
one that the plaintiff would likely have captured but for the defendant’s interference.”). 
234 See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 212-18 (1983) (“Having determined that a derivative right is in issue, it is far 
more difficult and consequential to draw the line that separates infringing from non-infringing 
derivative uses . . . . Judicial guidance has been uncertain at best.”). 
235 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
236 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 
116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1799 (2007) (noting that “[e]xclusion and governance can be contrasted” as ideas 
when thinking about property rights). 
237 KAPLAN, supra note 218, at 40 (emphasis added). 
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copying there can be no infringement of copyright.”238 With the development 
of new technologies, this has of course changed somewhat, such that today 
some forms of infringement—such as a public performance or public 
display—do not require copying in the strictest sense.239 Nonetheless, for the 
most part, copying is essential for infringement. 
Despite the centrality of copying to infringement, “[n]ot all copying, 
however, is copyright infringement.”240 This obviously complicates things 
further. To qualify as infringement, the copying certainly must involve an act 
of appropriation—i.e., of accessing a protected work and replicating its 
expression in whole or in part without authorization.241 Yet, it must do more 
than just be an instance of unauthorized appropriation. It needs to be 
“improper” or “wrongful,” something that copyright jurisprudence has 
struggled to make complete sense of for over five decades now.242 In addition 
to involving an act of appropriation and crossing a quantitative threshold (i.e., 
not be de minimis), the copying must also be qualitatively significant for it to 
be actionable. Ordinarily a question for the jury, this evaluative dimension of 
copying has proven to be difficult to distill down using specific normative 
criteria, with the result that courts (and juries) adopt a range of approaches 
and criteria during the determination.243 
In tortious interference with a prospect, the “interference” refers to more 
than just the defendant’s actions that produce a particular result, namely the 
nonrealization of the economic prospect. It instead entails a close scrutiny of 
the particular means employed by the defendant, which must in addition evince 
components that are illegal, unlawful, or unethical.244 In focusing on the 
propriety of the means employed for the interference, the tort can be seen as 
doing two things simultaneously. First, it takes attention away from a simplistic 
focus on result for actionability.245 Second, it then examines—on an individual 
basis—whether the defendant’s behavior should be objectively understood as 
 
238 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). 
239 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5) (2012). 
240 Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
241 See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188-89 (1990) (“The defendant must have seen or 
heard the plaintiff ’s work at some time prior to creating his or her own work and have used plaintiff ’s 
work in some fashion as a model. Thus, ‘copying’ . . . is the obverse of independent creation.”). 
242 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (noting that, once copying is 
established, the plaintiff bears the additional burden of showing that the copying was illicit). For a 
fuller discussion, see Balganesh, Normativity of Copying, supra note 202, at 214-33. 
243 Balganesh, Normativity of Copying, supra note 202, at 230-33. 
244 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
245 This is a corollary of the basic rule that bringing about an interference is not actionable as 
such, unless accompanied by improper means and the appropriate intention. See Restatement (First) 
of Torts § 766 cmt. d (1939) (noting that liability for tortious interference requires purpose by the 
tortfeasor to bring about the harm). 
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normatively problematic in the eyes of the action at issue (i.e., tortious 
interference), not just in the abstract. Consider a situation where a defendant 
willfully misrepresents information to a party, which in turn produces the 
nonrealization of the prospect. In a claim for tortious interference with a 
prospect, the law takes attention away from the mere nonrealization of the 
prospect and instead focuses on whether the misrepresentation—even if/when 
not actionable as an independent wrong—is of the kind that tortious 
interference with a prospect should consider problematic. The tort thus 
emphasizes a means–ends convergence for actionability. 
The focus on improper means—for the interference—can therefore be 
understood as the tort’s effort to draw attention to the relationship between 
four components in an analytical sequence: normative defect, action, outcome 
and consequence. Unless all four are aligned, the interference is not 
actionable. A tangible economic loss (consequence) from the plaintiff ’s non-
realization (outcome) of the probable prospect is necessary, which should be 
the result of the defendant’s act of interference (action), in turn carried out 
in a manner that displays behavior which the tort deems inappropriate as a 
normative matter (defect). Looking to copyright’s analysis of copying reveals 
a symmetrical structure. 
Even when shown to exist as a factual matter, a defendant’s copying must 
be “improper” to be actionable.246 While it is true that the analysis of 
impropriety does not scrutinize the process of copying in the way that tortious 
interference does, a closer examination reveals that it does purport to examine 
the existence of a means–ends alignment within the act of copying. What 
ultimately makes an act of appropriation wrongful is the assessment that it 
amounts to a form of freeriding on the parts of a work that produce a copy 
with substitutionary potential in the marketplace.247 In other words, the law’s 
use of the word “substantial” is a stand-in for whether the substitutionary 
potential of the copy was real, rendering the freeriding wrongful. Mere 
 
246 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
247 This is also accounted for by the focus on the ordinary observer to assess the similarity 
between the works, which is meant to serve as a proxy for an assessment of the substitutionary 
potential. The court in Arnstein observed: 
The plaintiff ’s legally protected interest is . . . his interest in the potential financial 
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his 
efforts. The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff ’s works so 
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for 
whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated 
something which belongs to the plaintiff. 
Id. at 473. (internal footnote omitted); see also Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 
(4th Cir. 1990) (“In light of the copyright law’s purpose of protecting the creator’s market, we think 
it sensible to embrace Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be 
oriented toward the works’ intended audience.”). 
2018] Copyright as Market Prospect 491 
substitutive similarity without such freeriding is insufficient, as is the mere 
act of freeriding without the production of a substantially similar copy. True, 
the evaluation of the means here is not one of examining the precise 
mechanism/method employed by the defendant during the copying, or of its 
ethics as such (e.g., bad faith, or use of a purloined copy). It is nevertheless a 
means-assessment in that it scrutinizes how the substitutive significance was 
realized during the appropriation, so as to warrant characterization as a 
wrongful act when the act is of the kind that copyright law should consider 
problematic in light of its normative goals. We then see an analytical pattern 
emerge here that is largely identical to that of tortious interference with a 
prospect. Copyright law treats an actual or imputed economic loss 
(consequence) from the creation of a substantially similar copy (outcome) as 
an actionable wrong when the result of a defendant’s appropriation of 
expression (action) that is seen as an evaluatively undesirable instance of 
freeriding on the plaintiff ’s work (defect). 
The normative defect attaches to the action, and taints it, which in turn 
extends to both the outcome and its eventual consequence. Both tortious 
interference and copyright law exhibit an interesting parallel in this sequence. 
 
Table 1: Analytical Parallels in Behavior under Scrutiny 
 
Tortious Interference Sequence Copyright Infringement 
Economic Loss CONSEQUENCE Actual or Imputed Loss 
Nonrealization of Prospect OUTCOME Substitutive Copy 
Interference with Realization ACTION Appropriation of Expression 
Ethically Suspect Behavior DEFECT Substantial Freeriding 
 
The parallelism revealed by the homology also sheds light on how 
copyright’s analysis of wrongful copying might be recast to better realize its 
purported means–ends alignment. To the extent that the wrongful copying 
analysis examines whether the defendant’s actions are improper—as a form of 
appropriative behavior—copyright law would do well to set out the normative 
variables that it uses to judge such behavior. While the delineation may be 
difficult to achieve in abstract, it may well be realized through specific 
behavioral proscriptions that guide future defendants and aid courts (and 
juries) in their decisionmaking. In other words, the wrongful copying test 
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might be better served by breaking it down into specific process-based 
components that are used to judge a defendant’s actions.248 Examples might 
include: the extent to which the defendant’s copying attempts to actively 
conceal its appropriation, whether it copies elements other than the plaintiff ’s 
work, the ease/difficulty involved in the appropriation at issue, and whether 
such appropriative behavior is commonplace in the creative sector under 
consideration. Considerations such as these would most overtly convert the 
inquiry into a means-based scrutiny. In the end, what the parallelism reveals 
then is that “copying” in copyright law encompasses not just the interference 
(action), but also the very impropriety of that action, which renders it a wrong. 
3. Volition, Subconscious Copying, and Intention 
For quite some time now, copyright jurisprudence has remained unclear on 
whether copyright infringement embodies an implicit requirement of volitional 
conduct, for liability to attach.249 In other words, must a defendant’s actions have 
been volitional, in the sense of being under the willing control of the defendant? 
Much of this debate arises from the fact that copyright infringement has often 
been characterized as a “strict liability tort,” implying that neither intention nor 
negligence were prerequisites for the imposition of liability.250 
Despite this, a few courts that have considered the issue have concluded 
that an infringement nonetheless requires an element of “volition[al]” 
conduct on the part of the defendant, before liability can attach.251 Thus, one 
court held that the operator of a Bulletin Board Service (BBS) could not be 
liable for infringing content uploaded by a user without some volitional 
conduct on the part of the operator.252 Another court put the point event 
 
248 For a recent effort in this direction, see Patrick Goold, Unbundling the “Tort” of Copyright 
Infringement, 102 VA. L. REV. 1833 (2016). Goold proposes recasting the infringement analysis into 
five separate categories based on the particular normative goal at stake. See id. at 1838 (outlining 
“five distinct ‘copy-torts’” that protect different interests). Yet Goold’s framework does little by way 
of suggesting specific criteria that the analysis needs to focus on to connect the defendant’s actions 
to the notion of wrongdoing for which the law is attempting to impose liability. 
249 See Denicola, supra note 205, at 1260 (“Several federal court decision have expressed 
uncertainty about the existence of a volition requirement.” (internal citations omitted)). 
250 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y., 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong.”); see also Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. 
Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (describing copyright infringement as a “strict liability tort”). 
But see Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
305, 310 (2015) (“[D]espite the widespread and orthodox belief [to the contrary] . . . . copyright 
infringement is not a strict liability tort because it does not hold the defendant liable simply 
[because] he infringed a right of the plaintiff. In addition, it must be shown that the defendant’s 
copying was wrongful.”). 
251 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
252 Id. at 1372-73. 
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more directly, noting that while an infringement “does not require that the 
infringer know that he is infringing or that his conduct amounts to a willful 
violation of the copyright owner’s rights, it nonetheless requires conduct by a 
person who causes in some meaningful way an infringement.”253 And this 
requirement of conduct, in turn, must exhibit “a nexus sufficiently close and 
causal to the illegal copying that one could” impute the illegality to the 
conduct (i.e., classify it as an infringement).254 
These observations seem to confirm that the act of infringement 
embodies an element of voluntary conduct on the part of the defendant.255 
They imply that (i) an act, as opposed to a mere omission, is crucial for 
conduct to be infringing; (ii) such act must be voluntary, in the sense of being 
under the willing control of the defendant; and (iii) no independent scienter 
requirement attaches to the idea of a volitional act. “Copying,” as the term is 
understood in copyright law, must therefore embody an element of volition. 
On closer reflection however, the idea is more complicated than it first seems. 
The paradigmatic act of copying—in its most basic sense—involves the 
process of appropriating expressive content from some source. It is true that 
copyright law does not care one bit whether that act was accompanied by a 
determinate knowledge as to the owner of the content being appropriated, an 
intent to so appropriate it, or indeed some negligence or recklessness on the 
part of the copier. At the same time however, the act of appropriation is not 
a simple physical act that is capable of being context-insensitive in the way 
that an act like speaking is. It involves a level of contextual advertence that a 
simple physical act (e.g., running) does not, since it always needs an object, 
being intransitive in construction. Put simply, copying requires advertence to 
the original—whatever is copied from. Copying therefore involves four 
elements: (i) prior expression in existence, (ii) knowledge of the existence of 
such expression, (iii) actual access to such expression, and (iv) a taking of 
such expression in the copier’s own use. For the copier to take expression, the 
copier must know of the existence of such expression and have access to it. 
Absent the copier’s knowledge of the expression being copied, it is 
 
253 CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004). 
254 Id. at 550. 
255 In its decision in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., the Supreme Court 
appeared to eliminate the requirement of volition altogether in relation to the public performance right, 
which as noted previously, does not embody the requirement of copying. 134 S.Ct. 2498 (2014). The 
dissent, in particular, took exception to this seeming omission by the majority. Id. at 2512-14 (Scalia, J. 
dissenting). Yet, a more plausible reading of Aereo is that the majority was adopting a presumptive 
approach to the question of causation, based on legislative history, which treated the broadcaster as 
having performed the broadcast, even when the viewing was under the immediate control of the end-
user. Id. at 2506. See also Denicola, supra note 205, at 1293-95 (“The majority [in Aereo] did not 
specifically mention ‘volition.’ . . . . The court’s analysis was cut short [by its application of] the 
Copyright Act. Since cable companies clearly perform under the Copyright Act, so did Aereo.”). 
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meaningless to allege copying. Without such minimal advertence, copyright’s 
core idea of independent creation would prove meaningless;256 mere 
similarity would form the basis of liability, without any concession for the 
possibility that such similarity was realized through means other than 
copying. The requirement of volition underlying copyright law therefore 
flows analytically from the type of action at issue, i.e., copying, and its simple 
pre-requisite of some minimal advertence. 
While copyright infringement has thus come to be understood as 
requiring an element of volition, copyright law has over the years also 
developed a rule that copying can be both conscious and subconscious.257 On 
the face of things, subconscious copying appears to contradict the advertent 
component of copying, and with it the understanding of copying needing to 
be a volitional act. Copyright jurisprudence allows a defendant to be held 
liable for infringement even when shown to have copied the protected work 
without actual knowledge of such copying when it occurs.258 A defendant’s 
good faith claim to have forgotten about the work that is copied from is 
therefore treated as irrelevant to infringement.259 On the face of things, this 
appears to contradict the volitional nature of copyright infringement. Yet, 
acknowledging liability for subconscious copying does not deny the 
requirement of volition for copying. Here again, looking to tortious 
interference with a prospect sheds light on how the facial contradiction 
between these two propositions in copyright law (i.e., volition and 
subconscious copying) might be reconciled. 
As an intentional tort, tortious interference insists that for liability to 
attach, a defendant (i) must actually know about the plaintiff ’s prospect, and 
(ii) intentionally interfere with that prospect.260 As noted previously, a 
defining feature of a prospect—in contrast with a contract—is the 
probabilistic nature of the plaintiff ’s benefit. This difference influences 
courts’ understanding of knowledge. The knowledge (of the prospect) that 
courts look for in a defendant is therefore of a lower magnitude than it is for 
a contract. One important respect in which this difference manifests itself is 
in the specificity of the prospect. To establish knowledge of a protected 
prospect, courts generally take the position that the prospect must merely be 
identifiable, and that the “specific identity or name” of the party/entity 
 
256 For an account of independent creation and its centrality in copyright law, see ABRAHAM 
DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 85-110 (2015). 
257 For further discussion of this topic, see 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, §13.08. 
258 ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“‘[I]nnocent’ copying can nevertheless constitute an infringement.”). 
259 Id. 
260 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 638. 
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comprising the prospect is unnecessary.261 This is in contrast to the 
requirement of intention, which they hold to a much more stringent standard. 
A defendant must have acted with the purpose of interfering with the 
prospect, or with the substantial certainty that the actions will result in such 
an interference.262 A mere intentional act that incidentally results in an 
interference is insufficient to meet the requirement.263 
What explains the variation in courts’ treatment of the knowledge and 
intention requirements of tortious interference with a prospect is the 
distinctive analytical role that each plays within the tort. The knowledge 
requirement is constitutive of an interference—as an act, rather than an 
omission or a result. To therefore engage in the act of interfering with a 
prospect, at a minimum an actor must know of its plain existence. To 
“interfere” with something implies a conscious act that inhibits an outcome, 
rather than just the result of the outcome not being realized.264 As with 
copying, much of this flows from the fact that an act of interference demands 
an object for its reference owing to its intransitive construction. The intention 
requirement on the other hand is not constitutive of the behavior being 
described, which can be fully described without such intention (i.e., a simple 
interference, or a negligent interference). The intention therefore accompanies 
the behavior (interference) at issue, whereas the knowledge (of the object) is 
treated as constitutive of it. The distinction between a constitutive state of 
mind and an accompanying one also explains how copyright law can embody 
a volition requirement, while simultaneously adopting an account of 
subconscious copying. 
The idea of subconscious copying confirms the idea that copying—for 
infringement purposes—need not be conscious, in the sense of embodying a 
scienter requirement. It therefore reiterates the idea that liability for copyright 
infringement is strict. On the issue of copying, it also supports courts drawing 
an inference that copying did in fact occur, from the circumstantial elements 
 
261 See, e.g., Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enterprises, 225 Cal. Rptr. 120, 126 
(Ct. App. 1986), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 5, 1986). (“The rule does not require, however, 
that the person who loses the performance of the contract as a result of the conduct of the actor 
should be specifically mentioned by name. It is sufficient that he is identified in some manner . . . .” 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. p (1979))). 
262 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 621; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) 
(“The word ‘intent’ is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor 
desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially 
certain to result from it.”). 
263 Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631, 633 (Cal. 1941) (“If the actor had no knowledge of 
the existence of the contract or his actions were not intended to induce a breach, he cannot be held 
liable though an actual breach results from his lawful and proper acts.”). 
264 See Interference, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (17th ed. 2016) (defining an 
“interference” as the act of “meddl[ing] with” something “without having the right to do so”). 
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of access and similarity even when a defendant quite credibly denies having 
engaged in a conscious taking of expression.265 In other words, subconscious 
copying does not negate the reality that the putative copier had some 
knowledge about the expression that was eventually copied, which is a 
constitutive dimension of the very idea of copying, when stripped down to its 
fundamentals. 
Thus, an individual who heard some popular music in his childhood, and 
many years later produced his own music incorporating into it elements of 
what he heard in his childhood might be said to have engaged in subconscious 
copying, insofar as he was unaware of his use of the prior expression in his 
own music and was not consciously deploying that knowledge.266 Yet, even 
here we do not deny (a) the existence of knowledge (about the protected 
music) in the copier at some point in time,267 or that (b) the copier deployed 
this knowledge in his own use. Subconscious copying is therefore perfectly 
compatible with a volition requirement underlying copying and its core idea 
of advertence to the protected original. Indeed, another way to understand 
their compatibility—drawing on tortious interference—is in the recognition 
that the advertence demanded by volition is internal to the very idea of 
copying, whereas the consciousness or subconsciousness that the 
jurisprudence on that question discusses goes to the defendant’s particular 
state of mind accompanying the copying, i.e., it is superimposed on the 
constitutive advertence. Volition is constitutive of the very act of copying, 
whereas the question of consciousness (or lack thereof) is about the 
defendant’s state of mind accompanying the act. Copying can therefore be 
both subconscious and volitional at the same time. 
Examining copyright’s volitional act requirement (for infringement) 
through tortious interference and its understanding of an interference thus 
reveals two important insights about copyright law. First, that the act of 
copying does indeed embody such a requirement, flowing as it does from the 
minimal advertence that the very act of copying/appropriation demands. 
Second, that such volition does little harm to the basic conception of 
copyright infringement as a “strict liability tort,” whether or not one considers 
it worthwhile retaining that oft-stated understanding of infringement. 
 
265 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“If there is evidence of access and 
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to 
prove copying.”). 
266 See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 483-85 (9th Cir. 2000). 
267 Id. Indeed, in the case, the court looked at the defendant’s actions and admissions to effectively 
infer such knowledge circumstantially, since there was no direct evidence of such prior knowledge. The 
defendant himself “believed he may have been copying someone else’s song” even though he didn’t 
remember precisely which one it was. Id. at 484. Nonetheless, the court’s reasoning was clearly premised 
on the fact that such knowledge did exist at a prior point in time, however remote. 
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4. Fair Use as Privileged Interference 
A plaintiff ’s entitlement in copyright law is subject to several important 
limitations and exceptions, of which the privilege of fair use is perhaps the 
best known.268 Originally a creation of courts in the nineteenth century and 
today codified in the statute,269 the doctrine of fair use exempts an act of 
infringement from liability if it complies with a set of four factors, each of 
which is to be weighed and considered using the facts of an individual case. 
These factors focus on the nature and purpose of the defendant’s use of the 
work, the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying, the nature 
of the protected work, and the effect of the defendant’s use on the market 
for the protected work.270 
A major unresolved controversy of some significance in copyright 
jurisprudence is whether fair use should be a part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie 
case, or instead an affirmative defense.271 The characterization determines 
which party bears the burden of proof for the issue, and the stage at which 
the issue is introduced during the proceeding. While this controversy is seen 
to have a largely procedural and evidentiary aspect to it, it masks a deeper 
confusion—namely, the substantive overlap between the established elements 
of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case and the fair use doctrine. 
As is well known, a central element of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case of 
infringement is that the defendant copied the plaintiff ’s work, which in turn 
requires proof that the defendant actually appropriated content and that the 
appropriation was quantitatively and qualitatively “substantial” so as to be 
actionable.272 This latter inquiry, the substantial similarity analysis, thus 
probes the magnitude and significance of the copying at issue,273 which is 
almost identical to the “amount and substantiality” of the defendant’s use, 
which fair use considers as an important factor in its analysis.274 It therefore 
appears redundant to undertake this inquiry twice. 
 
268 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (2012). 
269 Id. For an overview of the origins of the doctrine, see generally Matthew Sag, The Pre-
History of Fair Use, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1371 (2011). 
270 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
271 For an examination of the origins of these divergent views, see Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: 
An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 685-710 (2015). 
272 See Latman, supra note 241, at 1188-89. (“[C]opying, in order to be prima facie actionable, 
must include three elements: (1) The defendant must have . . . used plaintiff ’s work in some fashion 
as a model . . . . (2) The material copied . . . must be such as enjoys protection under copyright, 
[and] (3) [S]uch protected material must be ‘substantial.’”). 
273 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d. Cir. 1946) (“The question, therefore, is 
whether defendant took from plaintiff ’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners 
. . . that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”). 
274 See 17 U.S.C. §107(3). 
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A large part of the confusion for this redundancy appears to be a result 
of the origins of fair use. When it emerged in the nineteenth century, its 
core tenets came to be expounded as part of the infringement analysis—i.e., 
on the issue of actionable copying—rather than as an independent 
doctrine.275 This accounts for why—even through much of the twentieth 
century—courts treated precedent on fair use and actionable copying as 
interchangeable in their logic.276 Congress then for the first time codified 
the fair use doctrine in 1976, but in doing so said nothing at all about the 
infringement analysis, thereby seemingly acquiescing to its existing 
structure.277 This triggered the need to identify a separate domain for the 
fair use doctrine. 
To avoid some of this redundancy, some courts came to treat fair use as an 
“affirmative defense,” meaning that the defendant alone bore the burdens of 
persuasion and proof on the question.278 Neither the plaintiff nor the court 
were under any obligation to consider it if the defendant did not bring it up. 
As early as 1985, the Supreme Court confirmed the idea that fair use was an 
affirmative defense,279 and a decade later affirmed the idea most concretely by 
noting that this meant that the defendant bore the “burden of demonstrating 
fair use.”280 This position has persisted ever since. 
Yet, it sits somewhat oddly with the plain language of the copyright 
statute, which defines a copyright owner’s exclusive rights with the opening 
observation that the exclusive rights are “[s]ubject to section[] 107,” the fair 
 
275 The origins of the doctrine are traced back to the opinion of Justice Story in Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Folsom developed the central tenets of fair use as part of 
the question whether the defendant’s copying was exempt from liability for copyright infringement, 
rather than as a defense. Id. at 348. For an account of the case and its influence since, see L. Ray 
Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998). 
276 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis, 
68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 842-44 (2016) (“[In Arnstein], Judge Frank’s citation to cases of ‘abridgement,’ 
‘compilations,’ and ‘quotations of works of criticism’—three forms of copying that offer the copier a 
defense to an infringement claim—suggest that he conflated the standard for infringement with 
defenses to infringement.”). 
277 The infringement analysis finds no mention whatsoever in the copyright statute, or in the 
legislative history accompanying its enactment. Id. at 862-63. 
278 See, e.g., Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(“[The defendant] asserted, as [an] affirmative defense . . . the defense of fair use”); Ass’n of Am. 
Med. Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff ’d, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), and aff ’d 
sub nom. Appeal of Mikaelian, 734 F.2d 6 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he fair use exception to the Copyright 
Act is an affirmative defense”); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liecht., Black Inc., A. G. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff ’d sub nom. Roy Exp. Co. 
Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(“[T]he fair use defense is an affirmative defense”). 
279 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“The 
drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, 
but structured the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”). 
280 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
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use provision.281 This has caused several academic commentators to 
forcefully argue that fair use was intended—and had always been—a part of 
the plaintiff ’s prima facie case rather than an affirmative defense, especially 
given its close connection to the elements of the infringement analysis.282 
Somewhat more recently, this argument has begun to receive limited judicial 
validation. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the characterization of 
fair use as an affirmative defense, and emphasized that it should be 
understood as a “right,” but nonetheless retained placing the burden for it 
on the defendant.283 The Ninth Circuit, however, took this logic one step 
further in a case involving a notice and takedown provision of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).284 
The provision in question, § 512, enables a copyright owner to require a 
service provider to take down from its servers any content that infringes its 
copyrights.285 To enforce this request, the copyright owner sends the provider 
a “takedown notification,” with which the provider complies in order to avoid 
liability.286 In its decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that regardless of how 
one characterizes fair use—i.e., as a right or as an affirmative defense—in a 
takedown notification, the plaintiff–copyright owner should bear the burden 
of addressing it.287 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized the consequences of the classification over nomenclature. For 
now, the court’s logic is of course limited to § 512. Yet, as an analytical matter 
it applies with equal force to the standard infringement case as well. And this 
in turn brings us back to square one: if fair use is indeed a part of the 
plaintiff ’s prima facie case, how should the law account for the obvious 
substantive redundancy in the two? 
In tortious interference with a prospect (and contract), the jurisprudence 
has similarly oscillated between identifying aspects of the defendant’s 
behavior as components of the prima facie case and as better suited to an 
 
281 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
282 See, e.g., Loren, supra note 271, at 710 (“Campbell’s embrace of the notion that fair use is an 
affirmative defense . . . . was an error of statutory interpretation with seriously problematic First 
Amendment consequences.”); Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
135, 155-69 (2011) (“The placement of the fair-use provision in Chapter 1 suggests a presumption of 
fair use.”); Haochen Sun, Fair Use As A Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 136 (2011) (“The 
broad language used in section 107 of the Copyright Act . . . . does not, however, clear away all the 
uncertainty . . . . Despite the persistent uncertainty lingering around the fair use doctrine, fair use 
has uniformly been treated as an affirmative defense.”); see also, e.g., Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: 
Burden of Proof As Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1788 (2010) (“Tellingly, the Copyright 
Act never labels fair use an affirmative defense.”). 
283 Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996). 
284 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016). 
285 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
286 Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(C) & (c)(3). 
287 Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153-54. 
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independent privilege or justification, burden for which is placed on the 
defendant.288 One early commentator on tortious interference thus drew a 
distinction between the “prima facie tort” and the question whether the 
invasion was “privileged or justified.”289 In this dichotomy, the rational for 
the division appears to lie in its allowing the court to better realize the 
balancing exercise involved. Historically, the distinction came about owing 
to the tort’s relatively insignificant focus on the improper or wrongful 
nature of the defendant’s behavior, in comparison to its effect, i.e., the 
interference.290 The plaintiff therefore merely had to show an intentional 
interference, and the defendant then could prove that the interference was 
justified or privileged.291 Today, with the law having moved to incorporating 
an “improper means” element in its understanding, the division makes little 
analytical sense. Indeed, some cases even go so far as equating improper 
means with “unjustified” and placing the burden for it on the plaintiff, so 
as to eliminate all doubt.292 
The modern trend in tortious interference cases is therefore to treat 
what used to be the defendant’s privileges as a part of the prima facie 
case.293 All the same, this does not mean that the law has come to eliminate 
all use of affirmative defenses. As the leading treatise notes, in the modern 
understanding affirmative defenses in tortious interference actions 
represent situations where the defendant raises a claim unrelated to the 
culpability of its actions under the tort.294 In other words, when the 
defendant introduces a new consideration into the equation, that was not 
directly related to the action (as a substantive component), it rightly 
remains an affirmative defense. The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
288 See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620 (noting how under the traditional rule “the defendant 
could escape liability only by showing a privilege and shouldering the burden of justifying the 
interference”). 
289 Carpenter, supra note 21, at 745. 
290 See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620. 
291 Id. 
292 As Dobbs observes: 
Many of cases that place the burden of proof upon the plaintiff do so by saying that 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s interference was “unjustified.” That might 
sound as if the plaintiff is required to prove a negative—the total absence of 
justification. However, the statement probably only means that the plaintiff must 
present evidence and persuade the jury that the defendant’s conduct was improper 
because of the means used to interfere, or, perhaps, because of a wrongful purpose. 
Id. 
293 See, e.g., Advance Sign Grp., LLC v. Optec Displays, Inc., 722 F.3d 778, 786 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1042 (Ariz. 1985); Leigh Furniture & Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 305 (Utah 1982). 
294 DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620 n.6. 
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Wal-Mart Stores v. Sturges is illustrative.295 In Sturges, the court concluded 
that it made little sense to speak of an independent defense or justification 
if it was merely a denial of some part of the plaintiff ’s case.296 On the 
other hand, when it involved something completely unrelated, such as a 
claim of “complete or qualified privilege,” it rightly remained a defense.297 
Since Texas law requires the defendant’s means under tortious 
interference with a prospect to be independently actionable but not 
recoverable, the court specifically held that exemptions from such 
actionability that arise from independent considerations remain defenses 
that are to be raised by the defendant.298 
The core distinction therefore appears to be the extent to which the 
defense introduces altogether new normative considerations into the equation. 
These considerations are new only in the sense that they are not a direct part 
of the prima facie case for the tort, nor subsumed under its elements. An 
“absolute judicial privilege” is an example in situations where the plaintiff 
claims an interference with a prospect based on false testimony.299 
Tortious interference provides us with a way to think about the right-
versus-affirmative defense debate in fair use and potentially address the 
redundancy concern noted earlier. To the extent that the fair use inquiry 
deals with considerations that are more germane to the infringement 
analysis, they are better dealt with in the latter. Thus, questions about the 
quantum and significance of the defendant’s copying—relative to the 
plaintiff ’s work, or the originality of the plaintiff ’s work, are better dealt 
with in the plaintiff ’s prima facie case. All the same, there remain additional 
considerations relating to liability (for copyright infringement) that are (i) 
specific to the defendant, and (ii) about which the defendant is obviously 
best positioned to introduce evidence and information. Introducing these 
considerations into the equation does more than just negate/deny the 
plaintiff ’s case, it raises a new claim. It mimics what theorists of the common 
law refer to as a “plea in avoidance” or of “confession and avoidance.”300 It 
operates as an affirmative plea, in that by introducing new considerations 
into the liability determination, the plaintiff must now be given an 
opportunity to respond to it.301 
 
295 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001). 
296 Id. at 726-27. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 See DOBBS, supra note 23, § 620 n.6 (“For example, the absolute judicial privilege may be 
an affirmative defense available even when the plaintiff has proved wrongdoing, say by a witness’ 
false testimony that leads others to breach contracts with the plaintiff.”). 
300 Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 566-68 (1973). 
301 Id. at 567. For an application to copyright law, see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The 
Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012). 
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In this reformulation, the problem becomes less about mere 
nomenclature, but instead about differentiating between the myriad 
categories of claims that are today collectively described as “fair use” claims, 
based on the underlying normative considerations at work.302 Claims that 
focus entirely on the amount and significance of the use, as well as the 
purpose (commercial or noncommercial) to which the use is put are likely 
better dealt with as part of the prima facie case.303 On the other hand, when 
the defendant’s use involves a narrative about types and forms of art and the 
introduction of new meaning from a new context so as to claim a 
transformation, it directly implicates free speech and First Amendment 
considerations, which are better balanced against copyright’s utilitarian goals 
independent of the prima facie case.304 Along the spectrum will obviously 
arise a variety of different situations, which courts should be willing to 
wrestle with as a normative matter to determine whether they are better 
dealt with under the prima facie case or as a defense—taking a cue from how 
tortious interference has arrived at a workable equilibrium on the very same 
question. While there may be no easy (or one-size-fits-all) answers to the 
problem, looking to tortious interference suggests a pragmatic method for 
arriving at them. 
*      *      * 
The homology between copyright and tortious interference with a 
prospect suggests new ways of constructing and interpreting the regime’s 
various core tenets. Each of copyright’s central premises—the protectable 
interest, copying, volitional conduct, and fair use—has an important parallel 
in the different elements of tortious interference with a prospect. Table 2 
summarizes the homology described and the interpretive insights that flow 
from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) 
(providing a comprehensive review of the categories of fair use claims). 
303 E.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014) (addressing whether a 
university’s electronic course materials copied too much from copyrighted works or whether it was 
a fair use). 
304 E.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (addressing appropriation art as fair 
use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (considering whether a 
parody is fair use). 
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Table 2: Interpretive Parallels and Reform Insights from the Homology 
 
Tortious 
Interference 
Element 
Copyright Element Tentative Reform Suggestion 
from Homology 
Prospective Economic 
Advantage 
Actual/Potential Market 
for the Protected Work 
Determining the scope and 
boundaries of the market based on 
a “reasonable expectancy” 
Interference—Actual 
and Improper 
Copying—Actual and 
Wrongful 
Directly addressing the normative 
criteria which make copying 
“wrongful” or “improper” 
Knowledge of Prospect 
Advertence to Protected 
Expression (Volition) 
Confirmation of a volitional 
element in the idea of copying and 
its compatibility with strict liability 
Privileged/Justified 
Interference 
Fair Use 
Differentiating the infringement 
analysis and fair use based on 
considerations underlying the claim 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS 
Beyond the immediate doctrinal ramifications just discussed, the 
homology between copyright and tortious interference also embodies broader 
lessons for copyright jurisprudence and thinking. This Part considers three 
such implications. The first is justificatory, relating to copyright’s theory of 
incentives; the second conceptual, pertaining to how copyright is thought of 
by courts and scholars as an analytical matter; and the third is institutional, 
suggesting that the copyright system should place greater faith than it 
currently does in the ability of courts to tailor the entitlement. 
A. From Incentive-Creation to Incentive-Protection 
As noted previously, the most commonly advanced justification for 
modern copyright law today is the utilitarian theory of creator incentives.305 
 
305 See Balganesh, supra note 10, at 1577 (“Central to all of copyright law is the idea of 
incentives.”); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003) (“[I]t is through 
incentive language that judges are most empowered to make copyright law work as it should.”); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198-1204 (1996).) 
(“[The expansion of] copyright protection . . . has been accompanied by rhetoric championing the 
needs of the deserving author, emphasizing the need to induce creative activity, or both.”). 
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According to this account, copyright operates by inducing creators to produce 
creative expression through the promise of limited market exclusivity—i.e., a 
set of exclusive rights—in the work so created.306 The very rationale for 
copyright is seen as emanating from the regime’s ability to thus induce 
creators into producing work, which eventually inures to the benefit of the 
public by enhancing social welfare.307 
Characterizations of the incentives account do more, however. Not only do 
they portray the logic of incentives as the only rationale for copyright law and 
suggest that creators have no other reasons to create their works, but they also 
all too readily conflate the incentive produced by copyright (law) with those 
generated independently by the market. Consider the following statements 
about copyright’s theory of incentives, all drawn from Supreme Court opinions: 
o “By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”308 
o “The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.”309 
o “The provision of incentives for the creation of new works is surely an 
essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning.”310 
Each of these statements assumes that copyright law originates the 
incentive for creation that influences creators to produce. By “suppl[ying],” 
“creat[ing],” and “provi[ding],” the incentive to create, copyright is believed 
to function as an inducement for creativity.311 
Even assuming the account to be true as regards creators’ motivations, the 
characterization is grossly misleading. As a structural matter, it altogether 
disregards the role of the market in generating the incentive, which copyright 
is necessarily parasitic on. Without a plausible market for a work, no amount 
of copyright protection can induce creative production. All that copyright 
does is inject the element of exclusivity over an identified terrain of the 
 
306 See id. at 1203 (“[T]he limited grant [of rights] is a means by which an important public 
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors 
by the provision of a special reward.”). 
307 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003) (“The dynamic benefit of a property right is the 
incentive that possession of such a right imparts to invest in the creation or improvement of a 
resource in [a] period . . . .”). 
308 Harper & Row Publ’rs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (emphasis added). 
309 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (emphasis added). 
310 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012). 
311 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558; Sony, 464 U.S. at 450; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
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market, rendering the exploitation of the market easier. When that terrain is 
nonexistent, the exclusivity is superfluous. 
Thus, a novelist who believes that her book is likely to sell several copies 
on the market, which she can rely (with some confidence) as accruing to her 
because of copyright, might indeed be induced to write the novel. But if she 
knows that there is no market for the book to begin with—for whatever 
reason—under the incentives logic (assuming a basic level of rationality) she 
will have no reason to write the novel in the expectation of thereby accruing 
profits. Without a realizable market potential, copyright’s ability to induce 
creative expression is a simple nonstarter. When the novelist assesses the 
demand for the potential novel to be nonexistent, copyright cannot artificially 
and independently create a market for the work.312 
What this suggests then is not that copyright has no role to play in the 
incentives account, or that the incentives account is untrue. It suggests simply 
that the incentives account entails a symbiotic relationship between 
copyright’s promise of exclusivity and a realizable market for the work, which 
copyright law has no independent say in. Copyright shapes a putative market 
potential through its set of exclusive rights, by raising the prospect of its 
realization. But that is a far cry from creating or supplying the incentive on its 
own, in the way that courts caricature the justification. 
Rebecca Tushnet has made a similar point in prior work, calling into 
question the presumptive analytical independence of copyright and market 
incentives. While characterizing it as a “failure of incentive,” she notes that 
“regardless of the strength of protection, it is the likelihood of success in the 
market—a highly unpredictable variable, and one that [copyright] law can do 
little if anything to affect—that is key to whether new authors reap rewards 
from creating works.”313 Of course, an unpredictable incentive can be an 
incentive nonetheless, especially when actors are overconfident.314 While the 
connection between copyright law and market incentives may not point to the 
 
312 Another way of putting the point is to note that if copyright is about curing a market failure, 
a market failure presumptively requires the existence of a market to begin with, which must then 
fail. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 
991-96 (2002) (“[E]xisting economic analysis suggests no reason to presume, as a market failure 
approach necessarily does, that private markets will necessarily . . . prove efficient at ensuring 
adequate supply and dissemination of copyrighted works.”). 
313 Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 513, 517-18 (2009). 
314 See generally F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 20 
(Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (“To the extent that investments in technological and artistic 
creation are motivated by the longshot hope of a very large reward, intellectual property policies 
should sustain and reinforce that incentive system, not undermine it.”). 
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failure of the incentive theory, it reinforces the idea that copyright’s account 
of incentive creation is dependent on the market (i.e., market demand). 
Empirical proof aside, copyright’s theory of creator incentives therefore 
requires some readjustment, so as to acknowledge its dependence on the 
market (and on market demand). Without such an acknowledgment, its causal 
role risks being overstated. Tortious interference with a prospect provides the 
theory with a perfect mechanism for this readjustment—one that allows the 
incentives account to continue as a theoretical model, while readily 
confirming its dependence on the market. The answer thus lies in recognizing 
that copyright does not create the incentive to produce work, instead it protects 
that incentive when generated by the market. 
The incentive, if any, lies in the market prospect that a creator sees as a 
potential source of returns when the work is created and marketable. 
Copyright recognizes that this incentive is a low-probability one if unfettered 
freeriding (copying) is allowed, and therefore generates a structure of 
rights/liability to render the prospect easier to realize, i.e., it raises the 
probability of its realization by the creator. It thus takes a major component 
of the uncertainty surrounding the market prospect—relating to its 
appropriability, based on freeriding—altogether out of the equation. This 
readjustment also confirms an insight, made famous by Ed Kitch many 
decades ago within the patent context, about the ability of market prospects 
to act as incentives for risky activity.315 
The tortious interference homology therefore compels an important 
modification to copyright’s dominant justificatory theory, introducing a 
nuance into its formulation that takes it away from the realm of pure rhetoric 
and caricature that seems facially implausible (e.g., absent copyright, there 
would be no incentive to create). In so doing, the justification says nothing 
about the empirical basis for the theory and the assumptions that it relies 
on316 but suggests spending more attention on the details of the underlying 
market for the work and its construction of demand when speaking of 
copyright’s function as an inducement for creativity. 
 
315 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977) (presenting a view of “technological innovation as one in which resources are brought to 
bear upon an array of prospects, each with its own associated sets of probabilities of costs and 
returns”). For a recent elaboration, see John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 439, 443 (2004) (“[T]he prospect features of the patent system . . . are important 
because they determine not whether rents will be dissipated, but how they will be dissipated.”). 
316 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 29, 32 (2011) (“[T]here has been relatively little critical evaluation 
of the empirical legitimacy of the theoretical assumptions about copyright as an incentive.”). 
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B. The Relationality of Right and Liability 
Ever since its origins, copyright’s dominant conceptual discourse has 
framed the institution as granting authors a set of marketable exclusive 
rights.317 These rights are, in turn, deemed capable of independent analytical 
delineation.318 This trend has continued even after copyright’s domain has 
expanded to cover new subject matter and novel forms of creativity. 
Yet, the reality remains that each of copyright’s basic rights relates to 
potential behavior (on the part of a potential defendant) that requires 
elucidation on its own. In other words, each of the rights works by rendering 
such behavior within the exclusive domain of the author to engage in or 
authorize. The exclusive right to reproduce, copyright’s most fundamental 
right, is contingent on an understanding of reproduction. It grants the author 
the exclusive right to engage in such behavior. However, without a clear 
understanding of what exactly such behavior entails, it remains impossible to 
know what the author has an exclusive right to. And for this, copyright looks 
to its understanding of “copying,” developed as part of the standard 
infringement analysis.319 So it is with the exclusive right to publicly perform 
the work too.320 Absent an understanding of a public performance that is 
unauthorized and potentially infringing, it is impossible to know what goes 
into the author’s exclusive right to publicly perform the work, or to authorize 
such a performance. 
In a sense then, rights under copyright are each little more than exclusive 
rights to engage in behavior that defendants cannot. But what that behavior 
is is hardly self-evident or obvious. This is vastly different from other rights, 
such as property’s right to exclude, where the directive is both self-evident 
and clear, owing to the existence of an identifiable res.321 
 
317 The origins of this can be traced back to the Statute of Anne, which spoke of the “sole right 
and liberty” of printing being granted to authors. 8 Anne c. 19, § 2 (1710) (Gr. Brit.) (emphasis 
added). This has continued for nearly two centuries now. Both the 1909 and 1976 copyright statutes 
in the U.S. phrased their grant in terms of “exclusive rights.” Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 
60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (“[A]ny person entitled [to copyright] . . . shall have the exclusive 
right . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has [] exclusive rights . . . .”). 
318 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (delineating each of the author’s individual rights); Copyright 
Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (also delineating these rights). 
319 OSTERBERG, supra note 220, §1:1. For a detailed discussion of this origins of this analysis, 
see Balganesh, Questionable Origins, supra note 276. 
320 17 U.S.C. §106(4). 
321 See JAMES E. PENNER, The Duty of Non-Interference and Ownership, in THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW 128, 128-29 (1997); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to 
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 612 
(2008) (“The claim-right to exclude is understood through the correlative duty it imposes on others 
(in rem) to ‘exclude themselves’ from an identifiable resource.”). 
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In Hohfeldian terms, copyright’s exclusive rights are in reality privileges 
rather than rights.322 As distinguished from a right, a privilege entitles its 
holder to engage in an action without anyone else having legal recourse to 
prevent such action.323 Its correlative is a “no-right” in that no one has a legal 
claim to prevent its exercise.324 Most importantly, though, the opposite of a 
privilege is a “duty,” and, as Hohfeld emphasizes, the duty takes the “same 
content or tenor” as the privilege.325 Thus, a privilege to enter is the negation 
of the duty to stay off. The exclusive privilege to copy is therefore the 
opposite of the duty to not engage in such copying, though both take common 
color from the idea of copying, i.e., the behavior that is both privileged and 
proscribed by the directive. 
Tortious interference with a prospect very much captures this idea of the 
relationship between privilege and duty (or, in non-Hohfeldian imprecise 
terms, right and liability). The prospective economic advantage is but a 
privilege, rather than a physically identifiable asset. The copyright 
infringement plaintiff ’s exclusive privilege (of realizing the prospect) takes 
color and tenor from the restriction on the defendant’s behavior relating to 
that prospect. Right and liability are thus relationally connected, with each 
incapable of being understood without the other.326 The plaintiff has no 
abstract entitlement/claim to the prospect as such, other than a privilege which 
corresponds to the defendant’s obligation to not interfere with the plaintiff ’s 
attempt to realize it. The plaintiff ’s right is dependent on the defendant’s 
wrongful act, without which the right is substantively indeterminate. 
Copyright law would do well to acknowledge and admit the existence of 
a similar relationality between its conceptions of right and liability (or 
entitlement and wrongdoing). As noted previously, in tortious interference 
this relationality produces an inverse correlation in the plaintiff ’s case: the 
greater the wrongdoing, the more willing are courts to find a protectable 
prospect and vice-versa.327 Something similar already exists within copyright 
jurisprudence as well, which is rarely acknowledged. Works accorded weak—
or “thin”—protection, owing to their minimal originality, are saddled with a 
higher threshold of copying to establish actionable wrongdoing.328 
Conversely, highly original works obtain thick protection, and courts require 
 
322 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913) (“The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off.”). 
323 Id. at 32-33. 
324 Id. at 33. 
325 Id. 
326 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 23, § 638. 
327 See supra discussion accompanying notes 86–88. 
328 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[C]opyright 
in a factual compilation is thin.”); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Satava 
possesses a thin copyright that protects against only virtually identical copying.”). 
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a lower standard to establish infringement.329 In this variation, we have what 
is in effect a relational structure between the author’s “right” and the law’s 
measure of wrongdoing. 
Embracing the relationality of right and liability in copyright law is much 
more than just an academic exercise. It entails recognizing that, 
fundamentally, not all copyright protection is the same, and that protection 
means different things for different works and different contexts.330 This, in 
turn, would move copyright jurisprudence away from its banal use of property 
metaphors and ideas to understand the institution. At the same time, it would 
acknowledge the reality that different forms of creativity and creative 
processes are underserved by a simplistic one-size-fits-all approach to the 
copyright entitlement. 
C. Trusting Courts 
For the last several decades, copyright jurisprudence has come to place 
increasingly less reliance on courts. Whereas courts were considered active 
participants in copyright lawmaking under prior statutes, the 1976 Copyright 
Act minimizes their role and sees them as faithful enforcers of statutorily 
created directives.331 This mistrust, however, goes well beyond judicial 
lawmaking. It extends to courts’ role in shaping and delineating the copyright 
entitlement contextually in individual cases. Not only did earlier copyright 
jurisprudence look to courts to formulate copyright rules and principles in 
individual cases, it also relied on them to tailor parties’ entitlements in 
individual cases so as to give effect to those rules and principles. 
Courts therefore unhesitatingly engaged copyright policy at the retail 
level—as opposed to the wholesale/systemic level—asking whether particular 
goals were being furthered in individual cases and shaping the parties’ 
entitlements accordingly. The mid-twentieth century opinions of Judge 
Learned Hand represent a perfect example of this phenomenon at work. 
Working through copyright’s competing considerations and ideals, he 
developed nuanced techniques for delineating entitlements in different 
 
329 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 
1982) (“At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the ‘strongest’ works in which fairly complex or 
fanciful artistic expressions predominate over relatively simplistic themes and which are almost 
entirely products of the author’s creativity rather than concomitants of those themes.”). 
330 For an early identification of this concern, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law 
of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 518 (1945) (“The author’s monopoly or his remedy 
sometimes ought to be specially shaped to suit the particular form of his creation or the particular 
type of reproduction.”). 
331 See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1061-62 (2002) (“Courts 
are regarded with suspicion when they interpret statutes, as if they were out to thwart the intentions 
of the legislatures.”). 
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categories of copyrighted works. Only some of these have obtained the level 
of notoriety and admiration that they deserve, such as the abstractions formula 
of Nichols.332 Others, such as his idea of relying on the melody of musical works 
to identify their originality for infringement purposes—a method he called 
the comparative method333—or his idea of the “embellishments” approach to 
delineating the scope of protection in a derivative work vis-à-vis the material 
that it is based on,334 are less well-known and rarely discussed. 
Contrastingly, in recent times this form of retail-level entitlement 
delineation has become a rare occurrence. Two factors have contributed to this 
reality simultaneously. The first is the insistence—seen in the 1976 Act and 
afterwards—to comprehensively codify and define critical aspects of the 
copyright entitlement such that courts were meant to be faithful interpreters 
of a congressionally predetermined logic.335 Consequently, any purpose 
driven shaping of the entitlement became difficult to realize in the face of the 
statute’s overt one-size-for-all approach and the law’s efforts to cloak its 
purposes behind the veneer of neutral textual directives.336 The second is the 
growing emphasis on lay juries in copyright adjudication. Today, several 
crucial elements of copyright adjudication require the empaneling of a jury.337 
The infringement analysis is but one obvious area.338 As more and more 
circuits have moved to treating what were initially questions of entitlement 
delineation in copyright—such as the idea–expression dichotomy,339 
 
332 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Upon any work . . . a 
great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well . . . . [B]ut there is a point in 
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected . . . .”). 
333 See Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 875-76 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff ’d, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910) 
(“If the melody of the defendant’s chorus be transposed into the key of three flats, it exhibits an 
almost exact reproduction of the complainant’s melody.”). 
334 Stodart v. Mut. Film Corp., 249 F. 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff ’d, 244 F. 513 (2d Cir. 1918) 
(“[I]t is a good copyright in so far as the embellishments and additions to the plot are new and have 
been contributed by the copyright.”). 
335 See Leval, supra note 331, at 1062 (“Rather than passing brief statutes and relying on courts to 
find sensible solutions to emerging problems of interpretation, legislatures now write statutes hundreds 
of pages long, which seek to answer from the outset every problem that can conceivably arise”). 
336 See id. (“Interpretation must hew as closely as possible to a statute’s most literal terms, no 
matter how senseless such a reading may be.”). 
337 For a useful discussion, see 3 NIMMER, supra note 216, § 12.10. Nimmer notes that even when 
there are obvious areas that a judge—as opposed to a jury—is better positioned to decide, to the extent 
that the determination involves disputed facts, a jury needs to be empaneled. Id. § 12.10[B]. 
338 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946) (discussing the favorability of 
utilizing a jury in the context of factual similarities in infringement cases). 
339 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, § 13.03[B][2][a] (“Where only the plaintiff ’s idea has been 
appropriated, protection must be found, if at all, on a theory other than copyright infringement.”); 
see also JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is not the idea of a 
farting, crude man that is protected, but this particular embodiment of this concept.”); NEC Corp. 
v. Intel Corp., No. C-84-20799-WPG, 1989 WL 67434, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (concluding 
that question of idea–expression distinction goes to infringement, not copyrightability). 
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merger,340 and originality341—as more appropriately dealt with as part of the 
infringement analysis, these questions have ceased to be immune too from 
the jury. This growing insistence on juries for core copyright questions has 
quite understandably produced a good degree of reluctance among district 
courts to deal with complicated entitlement-delineation questions in 
copyright on their own, for obvious fear of reversal on appeal. In the end, the 
real loser has been copyright jurisprudence. 
Tortious interference with a prospect has had a long pedigree of success 
with such retail level delineation of the entitlement. Its very construction of 
the plaintiff ’s protectable economic prospect (prospective economic 
advantage) involves mapping broader considerations about the market and 
party behavior therein, on to individual claims in a contextual manner. And in 
that task, it has routinely trusted courts to work the system’s goals pure over 
time. This has in turn produced important—and workable—variations in rules 
between different contexts and facilitated an evolution of standards over time. 
An important systemic lesson that copyright reform efforts should learn 
from tortious interference lies in the utility of judicial entitlement tailoring at 
the retail level, as an effective supplement to the system’s realization of its 
goals and purposes in the aggregate. To the extent that copyright law has 
certain identifiable goals underlying its very existence (e.g., inducing 
creativity, or promoting free speech), it would do well to instantiate those goals 
doctrinally on an individual basis. Here, courts will have to play a crucial role. 
To be sure, scholars have previously proposed such retail level tailoring in 
different contexts,342 and a few courts have even attempted to instantiate such 
mechanisms in individual cases.343 These proposals have for the most part 
fallen on deaf ears, with recent discussions of copyright reform largely 
 
340 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, §13.03[B][3] (discussing the move towards treating merger 
as a part of the infringement analysis and describing it as the “better view”); see also Ets-Hokin v. 
Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 
705 (2d Cir. 1991). 
341 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 216, §13.03[B][2][b] (“[I]f the work . . . is not the product of his 
original authorship . . . then only a very close similarity, verging on the identical, will suffice to 
constitute an infringing copy.”). 
342 See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 189, at 942 (“In providing creators with exclusive public 
distribution rights, Congress would enable copyright owners to capture the value . . . without forcing 
the public to sacrifice other interests that copyright law was meant to promote.”); see also, e.g., 
Balganesh, Foreseeability, supra note 10, at 1604-05 (“The requirement of ‘foreseeable copyright’ 
would ask whether the defendant’s use . . . was forseeable to the plaintiff—in form and purpose—when the 
work was created.”); Chafee, supra note 330, at 510 (“The scope of protection for each kind of property 
. . . should be shaped to do the most good.”). 
343 The idea of “thin” protection for works that embody significant unprotected content is one 
relevant example. This was entirely a creation of the courts, with no guidance from the statute. The 
Supreme Court eventually affirmed the idea, too. See Balganesh, Normativity, supra note 202, at 221-
26 (discussing the idea of copyright entitlement “thickness”). 
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limiting themselves to the role of Congress.344 The solution may therefore 
well require a more overt statutory affirmation of the legitimacy, utility, and 
effectiveness of such judicial tailoring by courts (within the copyright 
statute), relying on the historical successes of the common law in this 
endeavor. Until this occurs, one suspects that the reform—if any—will have 
to occur incrementally. 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since its origins, copyright law has relied on metaphors and analogies 
to explain its functioning and to justify its very existence. In so doing it has 
striven to simplify and disaggregate its analytical and substantive complexity 
through comparisons to other areas. Over the years, these comparisons have 
served to solidify the status of copyright as an easily understandable subject 
area, one that generalist judges can interpret and apply with ease. At the same 
time however, these comparisons have underplayed the significance of 
copyright law’s own normative goals and structural nuances, about which they 
have contributed very little. The comparisons have for the most part been 
functionally unidirectional. 
Homological comparisons—between copyright and other areas—serve to 
remedy this unidirectionalism by allowing copyright to better reflect on its 
own internal structure owing to the commonality of normative goals. In so 
doing, they reveal underappreciated nuances within the conceptual structure 
of the copyright system and the ease with which these nuances might be 
rendered into reality in the actual functioning of the institution. The 
homological account offered here, between copyright and tortious 
interference with a prospect, represents precisely such an effort. 
While tortious interference with a prospect has been in existence for quite 
some time now, it has received surprisingly little scholarly analysis. All the 
same, it remains a fairly robust stand-alone cause of action within the 
common law. Its fairly unique doctrinal and conceptual structure, and the 
plurality of goals that it embodies, make it well-suited as a lens through which 
to analyze different aspects of copyright law. Viewing copyright through 
tortious interference with a prospect sheds important light on a variety of 
problems within copyright jurisprudence and suggests easy fixes to them. It 
allows copyright’s entitlement structure to more fully capture its probabilistic 
nature and focus on the centrality of the potential market for the work, injects 
some analytical sense into the infringement analysis, enables the notion of 
 
344 See, e.g., Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315,     
322-24 (2013) (suggesting that courts are “reflecting the wear and tear of the [copyright] statute” and 
proposing a comprehensive revision). 
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volition to have a firmer grounding in determining liability for infringement, 
and suggests a workable means of differentiating between the plaintiff ’s 
prima facie and a defendant’s fair use defense. Beyond these doctrinal lessons, 
it also recommends important theoretical and institutional implications for 
our thinking about the copyright entitlement and courts’ approach to it. 
Perhaps more so than anything else though, the homology showcases the 
perils of copyright exceptionalism, the belief that copyright law is best 
understood as distinct from other areas of the law. While copyright law has 
been—and can be—fruitfully understood through the use of cognate 
disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, it is only rarely that 
courts and policy-makers look to other areas of law for insights, both 
analytical and normative. The homology to tortious interference with a 
prospect shows us that copyright law can indeed glean invaluable and 
underappreciated operational insights from such interdoctrinal comparisons, 
in the recognition that the law is indeed a “seamless web.”345 
 
 
 
345 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1093-94 (1975). 
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